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INSIDER TRADING AS FRAUD* 
ZACHARY J. GUBLER** 
Federal insider trading law consists, for the most part, of federal common law 
rooted in a statutory regime that prohibits securities fraud. Commentators have 
long lamented this fact, viewing the law’s grounding in an antifraud statute as 
a quirk of history with little to recommend it. After all, what does fraud have to 
do with insider trading? 
A lot, it turns out. In this Article, I develop a theory explaining and defending 
the fraud-based nature of federal insider trading law. Specifically, I argue that 
Rule 10b-5, the antifraud rule in question, should be understood as altering the 
common law rule barring parties from contracting for fraud liability. As contract 
scholars have shown, this common law rule prevents contracting parties from 
effectively deterring certain hard-to-detect breaches of which insider trading is 
but one example. Rule 10b-5, I argue, reverses the common law rule, allowing 
contracting parties to contract for fraud liability and the accompanying 
extracompensatory damages for insider trading. 
The implications of this explanation of the fraud-based nature of insider trading 
are significant. First, it explains the current—often derided—shape of the 
doctrine. Second, it identifies the proper scope of insider trading liability, which 
is not, as many commentators have assumed, limited to purely fiduciary 
relationships. Third, it provides courts with a tractable way of identifying that 
scope of liability, laying out an inquiry that turns on the availability of 
alternatives to fraud liability for deterring insider trading. Finally, it implies 
that, in interpreting whether a given contractual arrangement gives rise to 
insider trading liability, the SEC should be able to cast a broader liability net 
than the courts. 
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Federal insider trading law1 is a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery” to 
repurpose a famous phrase.2 Consider, for example, that under settled law there 
is no insider trading liability when a thief—with no relationship to a company—
steals the company’s material nonpublic information and trades on it.3 By 
contrast, there is insider trading liability if the thief happens to be the 
company’s lawyer who trades on his client’s material nonpublic information in 
breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty and confidentiality.4 However, the lawyer 
can escape that liability simply by informing his client of his intent to trade 
ahead of time.5 In fact, he might even be able to escape liability by disclosing 
mere circumstantial evidence of his breach—for example, his bank account 
statement showing unusual (and unusually large) deposits.6 Let us refer to these 
three examples as the “unaffiliated thief,” the “brazen fiduciary,”7 and the 
“halfhearted fiduciary,” respectively. What explains the absence of liability in 
these three propositions? 
 
 1. When this Article uses the term “insider trading,” it means trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information regardless of one’s position. 
 2. See Winston Churchill, Russia: ‘A Riddle, Wrapped in a Mystery, Inside an Enigma’, in NEVER 
GIVE IN!: THE BEST OF WINSTON CHURCHILL’S SPEECHES 199, 199 (Winston S. Churchill ed., 
2003). 
 3. This is the clear implication of Supreme Court case law. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980); see also SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding an unaffiliated hacker liable on the ground that his 
fraud lay in his affirmative misrepresentation of identity). 
 4. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66. 
 5. Id. at 655. 
 6. Admittedly, this result is not as obvious as the others. However, it follows from Santa Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1977), where the Court held that there was no Rule 10b-
5 liability, and United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66, where it held that there was. The only 
difference between the two cases is that in Santa Fe, the breach arose in a context—a freeze-out 
merger—where there was substantial disclosure pursuant to federal law, so much so that it was not 
difficult for the plaintiffs to allege a fiduciary breach based on publicly available information. However, 
this might only follow once one views these two cases through the lens of the contractual fraud theory, 
which I think is one of its benefits. Many—if not most—commentators working with other theories 
find these cases to be more or less irreconcilable. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 7. This is Donna Nagy’s term. See Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of 
Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1257 (1998) [hereinafter 
Nagy, Reframing Misappropriation]. 
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One possibility is fraud. After all, Rule 10b-5,8 the heart of the federal 
insider trading law regime, prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.9 Perhaps these scenarios simply fall short of fraud. Upon 
closer inspection, however, this explanation does not seem immediately 
convincing. If fraud were to explain these results, then it is an unusual type of 
fraud, indeed. To be sure, the common law of fraud has long recognized liability 
where someone fails to disclose material information while under a duty to do 
so,10 but it does not typically countenance liability for breaches of other duties, 
such as the lawyer’s duty of loyalty and confidentiality in the hypothetical 
above. Nor should this result change if such breaches are done in complete 
secret (they usually are, after all).11 Therefore, it is not clear why disclosing such 
breaches, either by the brazen or halfhearted fiduciary, would have any effect 
on liability under traditional views of fraud. 
Perhaps for this reason, many commentators view insider trading law’s 
roots in fraud as hardly more than a quirk of history with little to recommend 
it.12 Instead, they tend to sidestep the text of Rule 10b-5 altogether, favoring the 
 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (making it illegal “(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (making it illegal “[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”). 
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1)–(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“(1) 
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or 
refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he 
had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under 
a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question. (2) One party to a 
business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the 
transaction is consummated, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them . . . .”). 
 11. See Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading 
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1323 (1999) [hereinafter Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts] 
(suggesting that all breaches are concealed and therefore that concealment is not a persuasive way to 
distinguish Santa Fe and O’Hagan). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between 
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1644 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading Regulation] (characterizing the insider trading prohibition’s location in a securities fraud statute 
as a “historical accident”); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 561 (2011) 
(“The fit between insider trading and securities fraud is famously awkward.”); Thomas Lee Hazen, 
Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
881, 889 (2010) (“[D]ealing with insider trading through an antifraud rule is like trying to fit a square 
peg into a round hole.”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Taking Stock: Insider and Outsider Trading by Congress, 5 
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view that insider trading is really about one of three things: enforcing property 
rights in information,13 rooting out private corruption perpetrated by 
fiduciaries,14 or protecting against unjust enrichment.15 But if there is a 
preference for these alternative theories, it cannot be because they do a better 
job than the fraud-based theory in explaining the shape of the law; they do not. 
The property and unjust enrichment theories cannot explain the lack of liability 
for the unaffiliated thief. One normally cannot avoid liability for stealing 
another person’s property on the grounds that the property owner is a perfect 
stranger.16 Nor does the fact that the parties are strangers make the enrichment 
any less unjust.17 Further, none of these alternative theories can explain why 
liability should turn on disclosure of the breach itself, whether of the brazen or 
more halfhearted variety.18 
In this Article, I develop a theory—what I call the “contractual fraud 
theory”—that is respectful of the fraud-based nature of Rule 10b-5’s text and at 
 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 159, 176 (2014) (characterizing as “refreshing[]” a proposal that the 
“federal courts . . . recognize that insider trading law does not involve fraud”). 
 13. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576–77 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the 
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1255 n.278 (1995) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Fiduciary Duties]; Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 
1589; Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 
861 (1983) (“[T]he insider trading debate is really a debate about whether the firm, as a matter of 
contract, should be able to allocate property rights in valuable information to managers or to 
investors.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 312 (arguing that “the central question [is] whether 
the principal [has] a property interest sufficient to require the agent neither to use nor to disclose 
[inside information] without the principal’s consent”); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A 
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1986); Kimberly Krawiec, Fairness, 
Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 443, 445 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules 
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (1984) [hereinafter Macey, From Fairness to Contract]; 
Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 804 
(1980) (discussing “protection to the property rights of the firm in inside information”). 
 14. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 932–33 
(2014). 
 15. See, e.g., Robert Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative 
to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 391 (1984) (explaining the proper way to calculate damages 
for insider trading assuming that liability inquiry has to do with whether someone has been unjustly 
enriched). 
 16. See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
 18. In fact, most commentators agree that the lack of liability for the “brazen fiduciary” is 
indefensible. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1003–04 (opining that this “doctrinally odd result makes no 
policy sense”); Nagy, Reframing Misappropriation, supra note 7, at 1256 n.169 (quoting another 
commentator as characterizing O’Hagan’s “full disclosure to the source exception” as a “foul ball” 
(quoting Joseph McLaughlin, ‘O’Hagan’: Some Answers, More Questions, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1997, at 1, 1); 
Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading 
After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 179–80 (1998) (characterizing this concession by 
the O’Hagan majority as “startling”); see also infra notes 124–37 and accompanying text. 
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the same time manages to explain modern insider trading law. I argue that the 
fraud-like remedies available under Rule 10b-5 serve to facilitate certain types 
of contracting over information that might not be available under the common 
law but that are nevertheless valuable in light of the high costs involved in 
detecting insider trading.19 
The contracting problem at the heart of the contractual fraud theory arises 
from the observation that, in most cases, the information that forms the basis 
of insider trading does not benefit from the protection of property rights.20 
Imagine a firm that wishes to hire a consultant to provide strategic advice 
regarding a potential merger. If the firm wants to protect its merger-related 
information against impermissible uses by the consultant, including insider 
trading,21 it will need to rely on fiduciary duty law (assuming the consultant is 
a fiduciary) and contract law. Both sources of law incorporate provisions that 
prohibit insider trading. Under the duty of loyalty, fiduciary duty law prohibits 
a fiduciary from using its principal’s assets—including the principal’s 
information—for its own gain.22 Under contract law, contracting parties can 
make use of confidentiality and non-use provisions that would similarly prohibit 
insider trading.23 
 
 19. As contract scholars have shown, the costs of verifying a contract breach (what I call here, 
“the costs of detection”) can cause contracting to break down. See Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, 
Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33, 33–35 (2003); Gregory Klass, Contracting for 
Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2007). The obvious contractual solution to the problem 
posed by the costly detection inherent in insider trading is to contractually require the information 
recipient to cooperate in recovery. But such contractual provisions—like an obligation to disclose a 
breach—are not effective unless enforced with fraud liability, which is not available under the common 
law. By restoring fraud liability for insider trading, Rule 10b-5 helps solve this contracting problem. 
 20. The domain of patent law is limited to processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or 
compositions of matter. If copyright law applied to the information, it would only prevent it from 
being duplicated in a graphic form. Finally, trade secret law covers information essentially having to 
do with the domain of patent law and, therefore, would exclude the type of event-driven market 
information discussed in the example. 
 21. Perhaps the firm does not want there to be unusual trading in the target company’s stock for 
fear of prematurely tipping off the market to a pending merger announcement. See Carlton & Fischel, 
supra note 13, at 881–82; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 328–29. More generally, however, the firm’s 
confidential information is an asset, and it does not want to give away that asset for free. See, e.g., 
Michael Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 232–33 
(2012) (discussing how biotech companies exchange valuable information in the absence of property 
rights). 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a 
duty (1) not to use property of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party; and 
(2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes 
or those of a third party.”). For this reason, courts usually view insider trading as a breach of fiduciary 
duty. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 905 (Del. Ch. 2004); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 
A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949). 
 23. See, e.g., MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY 
350–51 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (setting forth a model nonuse and confidentiality provision). 
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However, this is, at best, only an incomplete solution to the problem 
facing our hypothetical firm because it only works if the firm is able to detect 
when the consultant has breached that underlying duty. And yet, given 
information’s non-rivalrous nature24—in other words, the fact that its use does 
not alter anyone else’s use—insider trading is an almost archetypal example of 
a breach that is very costly to detect.25 As the contract literature points out, in 
cases where such detection costs are high, contracting might break down.26 
There is, however, one possible contracting solution to this “costly 
detection problem.”27 Our hypothetical firm could decide to contractually 
require the consultant to cooperate with it in detecting a breach of the 
underlying duty, whether that underlying provision is located in a fiduciary 
relationship or a contractual one.28 In particular, the firm could insist on a 
covenant to report any breach of the underlying duty. Let us call this a 
“reporting covenant.” Thus, the firm would effectively say to the consultant: 
“You are prohibited from using our information for insider trading purposes, 
and you have an obligation to report any insider trading in violation of this 
covenant not to trade.” 
This is a potentially elegant solution but only if the failure to report the 
underlying violation—in our example, the insider trading—is subject to 
extracompensatory damages. After all, if the underlying violation gives rise to 
contract damages and the failure to report that violation does not result in any 
additional damages, then there is no incentive to report the violation.29 The 
solution is “elegant” because normally the failure to disclose information in the 
face of a duty to do so constitutes fraud and is subject to extracompensatory 
damages.30 However, notice that it is only potentially elegant because, at 
common law, courts are extremely reluctant to allow contracting parties to 
“contract for fraud liability”; that is to say to enforce the breach of a contractual 
 
 24. Non-rivalry is the property of a good whereby use of the good by one person does not 
diminish the value of its use to another. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property 
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly 
Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–05 (2008) (providing confidentiality agreements as an 
example of a contract provision with high detection costs). 
 26. See id. at 503 (“In contract theory, verification costs are an important barrier to complete 
contracts.”). 
 27. The contract literature actually tends to refer to these problems as ones involving costly 
verification, by which it means to refer to the costs of proving a breach in court. See, e.g., Klass, supra 
note 19, at 2. I instead choose to use the word “detection” throughout this Article, even though I mean 
the same thing as “verification,” simply because I think it is more intuitive for those readers who are 
not familiar with the contracting literature. 
 28. In other words, while the underlying confidentiality or non-use agreement might come from 
fiduciary duty law or contract, the reporting covenant would be an additional contract provision that 
overlays the relationship. 
 29. Klass, supra note 19, at 7, 12. 
 30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1)–(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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disclosure obligation through extracompensatory (in other words fraud) 
damages.31 
Under the contractual fraud theory, Rule 10b-5 reverses this common law 
rule, at least with respect to a particularly hard-to-detect breach: insider trading. 
This means that parties can explicitly contract for fraud liability for insider 
trading through the use of a reporting covenant like the one in our hypothetical. 
That, in and of itself, constitutes a significant break with the common law.32 But 
the contractual fraud theory also means that courts can—in certain 
circumstances—find that parties have contracted for fraud liability implicitly 
under Rule 10b-5. To make this determination, courts—but not necessarily the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)33—should engage 
in the hypothetical bargain analysis familiar to contract scholarship.34 In other 
words, the court should ask whether the parties themselves would have opted 
into the Rule 10b-5 regime if they had explicitly addressed this issue. 
The contractual fraud theory represents a dramatic departure from how 
scholars have traditionally thought about federal insider trading law. Under 
what is arguably the dominant theory,35 insider trading law is about protecting 
property rights in information.36 The contractual fraud theory turns that 
thinking on its head. Under this new theory, insider trading law is not about 
protecting property rights in information; it is about facilitating contracting 
over information in the absence of property rights.37 
The contractual fraud theory has several advantages. First, it is simply 
more respectful of the fraud-based nature of Rule 10b-5’s text than alternative 
 
 31. See Klass, supra note 19, at 2. 
 32. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract.”). 
 33. The SEC should probably take a different approach, considering not simply the private 
welfare of the contracting parties but the welfare of the public more generally. This means that the 
SEC might have a different view of the scope of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 than the 
Supreme Court. See infra Section III.C. 
 34. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1877 (1991) (“Courts generally interpret contracts — resolve ambiguities and 
fill in missing terms — by asking what the parties would have agreed to had they explicitly addressed 
the issue before the court.”). 
 35. See Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1606 (“There is a growing 
consensus that the federal insider trading prohibition is more easily justified as a means of protecting 
property rights in information than as a way of protecting investors.”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. There is some work on the more general issue about how one can contract for information in 
the absence of property rights, including the nonlegal strategies that contracting parties take to limit 
impermissible uses of the information being shared. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 21, at 227. As 
discussed in greater depth below, contracting parties can of course undertake such strategies to limit 
insider trading. See infra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. However, there is a point where it is 
more cost effective to rely on the threat of legal liability as a mechanism to deter such impermissible 
uses. 
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theories of insider trading.38 Furthermore, unlike the other available theories, 
the contractual fraud theory actually explains the law as it has been received.39 
In particular, the contractual fraud theory helps untangle that “riddle, wrapped 
in a mystery” mentioned previously.40 Take the case of the lack of liability for 
the unaffiliated thief. Because the contractual fraud theory requires—at the very 
least—a contractual relationship, there shouldn’t be any liability in that 
situation, which is what the cases tell us.41 And since, under the contractual 
fraud theory, the point of Rule 10b-5 is to lessen the costs of detecting insider 
trading, there shouldn’t be liability where those costs are already at a minimum 
because the brazen or halfhearted fiduciary has essentially disclosed the 
breach.42 Again, this is precisely the result reached in the relevant jurisprudence. 
If the contractual fraud theory is correct, then the implications for insider 
trading law are significant. First, contrary to the claims of certain 
commentators,43 insider trading liability should not be limited to purely 
fiduciary relationships but should extend to at least some contractual ones as 
well.44 Second, the contractual fraud theory implies that it is misguided for 
courts, like the Second Circuit in its influential United States v. Chestman45 
opinion, to determine whether Rule 10b-5 applies to a non-fiduciary 
relationship through the use of an unwieldy, indeterminate list of factors aimed 
at identifying what is essential about fiduciary relationships.46 The point of the 
contractual fraud theory is that, for purposes of insider trading law, there is in 
fact nothing magical about fiduciary relationships. Rule 10b-5 is really about 
harnessing contract-based fraud liability to solve a contracting problem left 
unaddressed by the common law. Whether the underlying duty to refrain from 
insider trading arises from fiduciary duty law47 or a contract provision48 is beside 
the point. 
 
 38. See infra Section II.B.2–3. 
 39. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 40. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Regulating Insider Trading in the Post-Fiduciary Duty Era: 
Equal Access or Property Rights?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 80, 87 (Stephen M. 
Bainbridge ed., 2013) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Post-Fiduciary Duty Era]. 
 44. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 45. 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 46. See id.; United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (characterizing 
Chestman as requiring the following elements to establish a fiduciary-like relationship: “1) disparate 
knowledge and expertise, 2) a persuasive need to share confidential information, and 3) a legal duty to 
render competent aid”). 
 47. The common law says that it does. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 905 (Del. Ch. 
2004); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that insider trading is a 
violation of the duty of loyalty). 
 48. For example, a traditional non-use provision prohibiting the contracting party’s use of its 
counterpart’s information for anything other than a narrowly defined set of things. 
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Finally, the contractual fraud theory gestures toward the proper role the 
courts and the SEC should play in determining the scope of insider trading 
liability. With respect to the courts, the question they should address is whether 
there are reasons to believe that the relevant parties would have wanted their 
contractual solution for protecting the information at issue to be enforced by 
the extracompensatory damages of Rule 10b-5.49 With respect to the SEC, the 
contractual fraud theory would allow a broader inquiry that takes into account 
not just the private costs and benefits of insider trading but the public ones, as 
well. In this sense, under the contractual fraud theory, the SEC might take a 
different view of Rule 10b-5 than the courts. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I is background. It tells the story 
of how the Supreme Court and the SEC have constructed a body of insider 
trading law based on Rule 10b-5. It also discusses the extant theories of insider 
trading, those narratives that explain what insider trading is all about, and why 
these theories do a poor job of explaining the law as it has been received. Part 
II develops the contractual fraud theory, demonstrates how it differs from the 
extant theories of insider trading, and explains why it does a better job than 
those theories in explaining the current state of the law. Part III sketches out 
the implications of the contractual fraud theory and identifies what the theory 
means for the future of federal insider trading law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 1942, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5,50 which prohibits fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.51 The rule was adopted with 
little fanfare, which should not be all that surprising considering that it was 
viewed at the time as little more than a rule aimed at addressing securities 
fraud.52 There was no indication that anyone thought that the rule had anything 
 
 49. This question will itself turn on additional considerations, including the difficulty of detecting 
the breach in question and the availability of alternative methods for enforcing compliance. See infra 
Section II.A.1.a. 
 50. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices by any Purchaser of a Security, 13 Fed. 
Reg. 8183–84 (Dec. 22, 1948), codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (making it illegal “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”); see 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (making it illegal “(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) [t]o engage in any act practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
 52. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 467 (2005). In fact, in 
one of the few comments made regarding the proposed rule, Commissioner Sumner Pike famously 
said, “[W]e are against fraud, aren’t we?” Id. 
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to do with insider trading law. However, the lack of any forthcoming insider 
trading legislation on the part of Congress, combined with an increasing 
number of insider trading cases crossing the SEC’s desk, required the 
Commission’s enforcement arm to get creative. So, in the early 1960s, the SEC 
began crafting a strategy to build insider trading law on top of Rule 10b-5.53 
This strategy led to a winning streak in the lower courts, causing the great 
Professor Louis Loss to observe that “Rule 10b-5 . . . seems to be taking over 
the universe gradually.”54 It wasn’t until the late 1970s that the Supreme Court 
started imposing constraints on the SEC’s vision.55 
A. How Insider Trading Laws Have Developed 
1.  Santa Fe v. Green: The Centrality of Fraud 
Of these constraints, one of the most important was articulated in Santa 
Fe Industries Co. v. Green,56 when the Supreme Court held that Rule 10b-5 
required something more than just a garden-variety state fiduciary duty claim.57 
In other words, when the rule discussed fraud, it really meant fraud. 
Santa Fe involved a shareholder challenge to a freeze-out merger by the 
majority shareholder.58 The plaintiffs in the suit, minority shareholders who 
voted against the merger, objected to the merger price on the ground that it 
undervalued the corporation’s assets.59 These shareholders could have brought 
an action in the Delaware Chancery Court, the place of the target’s 
incorporation, for a judicial appraisal of the value of their shares.60 Instead, they 
brought a suit in federal court under Rule 10b-5.61 
The problem, however, was that Rule 10b-5 requires fraud, and there was 
no apparent fraud in the case.62 There was no breach of an affirmative 
representation. Nor was there any fraudulent non-disclosure, at least not under 
the traditional reading of that doctrine.63 Under the traditional reading, a claim 
 
 53. See Adam C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 843–44 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Powell and the 
Counterrevolution]. 
 54. See id. at 843. 
 55. See id. at 843–44. 
 56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 57. See id. at 479–80. 
 58. See id. at 465–66. 
 59. See id. at 466–67. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 467. 
 62. See id. at 474. 
 63. I say “traditional reading” to distinguish it from the theory of fraud that the Court identified 
in O’Hagan and that I am characterizing under the contractual fraud theory of insider trading as a case 
of the Court finding an implicit reporting covenant—a promise to disclose the breach of an underlying 
covenant, either a confidentiality or non-use provision, prohibiting insider trading. Non-disclosure of 
a breach is not historically what gives rise to fraudulent non-disclosure. 
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for fraudulent non-disclosure arises from a fiduciary’s failure to disclose 
material information to a principal with whom the fiduciary is engaged in a 
transaction.64 In Santa Fe, the majority shareholder of the target company owed 
fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders with whom the majority 
shareholder was engaged in a transaction to acquire the minority shareholders’ 
shares in the target firm.65 However, all of the information that the majority 
shareholder had used to value the target’s assets and to arrive at a merger price 
had been disclosed, and disclosed accurately, to the shareholders prior to the 
merger vote.66 Indeed, it was these very disclosure materials that the 
shareholders relied on to demonstrate that the merger price was too low in light 
of the value of the underlying corporate assets.67 Thus, under the traditional 
reading of fraudulent non-disclosure, there was no non-disclosure. 
Consequently, the shareholders’ allegations consisted of little more than a claim 
that the majority shareholder and the target executives had breached their 
fiduciary duties.68 Without more, the Court held, there could be no liability 
under Rule 10b-5.69 
2.  Chiarella v. United States: Origins of the Fiduciary-Based Theory 
The Santa Fe opinion placed a significant constraint on the SEC’s attempts 
to use Rule 10b-5 to construct a coherent body of insider trading law. However, 
it did not mean that the enterprise was futile. In 1980, the Supreme Court 
finally endorsed a theory of primary liability for insider trading that was 
consistent with the statute’s focus on fraud as set forth in Santa Fe. In Chiarella 
 
 64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1)–(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“(1) 
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or 
refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he 
had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under 
a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question. (2) One party to a 
business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the 
transaction is consummated, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them . . . .”). 
 65. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 465–66. 
 66. See id. at 466 (“The minority stockholders of Kirby were notified the day after the merger 
became effective and were advised of their right to obtain an appraisal in Delaware court if dissatisfied 
with the offer of $150 per share. They also received an information statement containing, in addition 
to the relevant financial data about Kirby, the appraisals of the value of Kirby’s assets and the Morgan 
Stanley appraisal concluding that the fair market value of the stock was $125 per share.”). 
 67. See id. at 467 (“The amended complaint asserted that, based on the fair market value of Kirby’s 
physical assets as revealed by the appraisal included in the information statement sent to minority 
shareholders, Kirby’s stock was worth at least $772 per share.”). 
 68. See id. at 477 (“No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that 
might be used to manipulate securities prices. But we do not think it would have chosen this ‘term of 
art’ if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate mismanagement such as 
this, in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary.”). 
 69. See id. at 479–80. 
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v. United States,70 the Court held that Rule 10b-5 prohibited a corporate insider 
from trading in his own corporation’s stock based on material nonpublic 
information belonging to his corporation.71 Of course, this rule had to be 
reconciled with the holding of Santa Fe. But the Chiarella Court was confident 
that it satisfied the statute’s requirement of fraud.72 
In this judgment, the Court relied heavily on an influential SEC opinion 
called Cady, Roberts.73 In that opinion, the Commissioner of the SEC himself, 
William Cary, had opined that insider trading is a form of fraudulent 
concealment and therefore is fraudulent under the common law.74 More 
specifically, in Cary’s view, the majority rule in the states was that a corporate 
insider, by virtue of his fiduciary relationship, owes a duty of disclosure to his 
corporation’s shareholders.75 The insider violates this disclosure duty when he 
trades in his corporation’s stock without disclosing any material nonpublic 
information pertaining to that stock to the shareholder on the other side of the 
transaction.76 
But Cary, it turns out, was wrong.77 No state court had agreed, at least not 
when the insider was trading in the type of impersonal, exchange-based market 
at issue in the typical insider trading case.78 Nevertheless, the Chiarella Court 
deferred to the Cady, Roberts opinion, thus giving birth to the “classical theory” 
of insider trading.79 
The classical theory was far from perfect, and, in fact, would eventually 
lead to many unintended and untoward consequences. For example, under its 
logic, there would be no liability for insider trading in debt securities.80 Nor 
would there be liability for insiders who sold (rather than purchased) securities, 
 
 70. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 71. See id. at 231–32. 
 72. See id. at 232–33. 
 73. Id. at 277 n.8; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 74. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910–11, 911 n.13. 
 75. See id. at 911. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Adam C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy 
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 22–26 (1998) [hereinafter Pritchard, Agency Law and 
Powell’s Legacy] (providing an overview of the history surrounding the legal precedent). 
 78. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Fiduciary Duties, supra note 13, at 1220 (“The uniform state law 
approach in the secondary market context remained a no duty rule.”); Pritchard, Agency Law and 
Powell’s Legacy, supra note 77; see also Barbara A. Ash, State Regulation of Insider Trading—A Timely 
Resurgence?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 399 (1988); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider 
Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 361 (1988). 
 79. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
 80. Insiders owe no duties to debtholders, and the breach of a fiduciary duty is the predicate for 
insider trading liability under the traditional reading of the classical theory, where the person on the 
other side of the insider’s trade is a debtholder. See Pritchard, Agency Law and Powell’s Legacy, supra 
note 77, at 28. 
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even if based on material nonpublic information.81 Moreover, the classical 
theory only applied to corporate insiders.82 It failed to reach the case where a 
person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information in the stock of a 
corporation with which the trader has no relationship, or at least no fiduciary 
relationship.83 The SEC needed another theory of primary liability for this type 
of “outsider trading.” 
3.  United States v. O’Hagan: Origins of the Contractual Fraud Theory 
The SEC got what it was looking for in United States v. O’Hagan.84 The 
defendant in that case was James O’Hagan, a partner in the law firm of Dorsey 
& Whitney in Chicago.85 At the time, O’Hagan’s law firm was representing a 
company called Grand Met in a tender offer for Pillsbury, a transaction that, 
once announced publicly, would cause the price of Pillsbury stock to increase 
significantly.86 Although O’Hagan was not actually working on the tender offer 
itself, he obtained possession of the information by virtue of his relationship 
with his law firm.87 He then purchased a substantial amount of Pillsbury stock 
and call options that, upon announcement of the tender offer, netted O’Hagan 
over $4.3 million in profit, which O’Hagan apparently used to conceal his prior 
embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust funds.88 
O’Hagan was convicted on all fifty-seven counts of the indictment and 
sentenced to forty-one months in prison.89 Incredibly, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed all of O’Hagan’s convictions on the theory that O’Hagan had no duty 
to the shareholders against whom he was trading (in this case Pillsbury 
shareholders) and therefore was not liable under the classical theory of insider 
trading.90 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eighth Circuit, articulating a 
new ground for primary liability that would reach corporate “outsiders” like 
O’Hagan.91 The misappropriation theory that the O’Hagan Court adopted 
 
 81. Because insiders owe no duties to “potential shareholders,” and the breach of a fiduciary duty 
is the predicate for insider trading liability under the traditional reading of the classical theory, there 
is no insider trading liability where the person on the other side of the insider’s trade is a potential 
shareholder, as is often the case where the insider is selling rather than buying. See id. at 26. 
 82. Because insiders owe no duties to stockholders of other corporations where such insiders are 
not employed, there is no liability where such insiders trade on the basis of material nonpublic 
information in the stock of such other corporations. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–
53 (1997). 
 83. See id. 
 84. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 85. See id. at 647. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 647–48. 
 88. See id. at 648. 
 89. See id. at 648–49. 
 90. See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 91. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66. 
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extends Rule 10b-5 liability to defendants who owe a duty of loyalty or 
confidentiality to the source of the nonpublic information that forms the basis 
of the trade.92 
As the O’Hagan Court explained, “[u]nder [the misappropriation] theory, 
a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase 
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the 
principal of the exclusive use of that information.”93 For the majority, the fraud 
underlying the misappropriation theory arises from the fact that the fiduciary 
failed to report the breach of the underlying covenant not to profit from the 
principal’s property.94 The clear implication, which the O’Hagan majority 
explicitly identified, is that a trader in O’Hagan’s position could avoid 10b-5 
liability by notifying his information source of an intent to trade on its 
information.95 This is the “brazen fiduciary” problem identified in the 
introduction to this Article,96 and it is one of the most criticized aspects of the 
O’Hagan decision.97 Indeed, one commentator has flatly said that it “makes no 
policy sense.”98 
The O’Hagan Court had to overcome several conceptual and doctrinal 
hurdles in adopting the misappropriation theory. First, the Court had to come 
to terms with the statutory requirement that the fraud be “in connection with” 
the purchase or sale of a security.99 The majority reasoned that: “This element 
is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary 
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his 
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities 
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.”100 
This coincidence test proved controversial and not without reason. On the 
one hand, the test was underinclusive, potentially barring tipper-tippee liability 
since the tipper’s fraudulent tip does not coincide with the tippee’s subsequent 
securities transaction.101 But it was also arguably overinclusive, potentially 
 
 92. See id. at 652. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. See id. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves 
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to 
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—
although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of 
loyalty.”). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1004. 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 
 100. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
 101. In particular, the coincidence test would arguably foreclose the possibility of using the 
misappropriation theory to reach tippers and tippees. In the case of the misappropriating tipper, the 
fiduciary’s breach does not coincide with the tippee’s securities transaction. And therefore, under the 
coincidence test, the tip falls outside the scope of the statute. For this reason, lower courts have 
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giving rise to liability in cases that seem far afield from the concerns of the 
federal securities laws, “for example where a broker is directed to purchase stock 
for a client and instead purchases such stock—using client funds—for his own 
account.”102 The majority’s response to this argument was that the 
misappropriation of information (some of which falls within the statute’s reach) 
is simply different from the misappropriation of money (which falls outside of 
the reach of the statute).103 The reason is that misappropriated information 
derives its value “ordinarily” from its utility in securities trading whereas 
misappropriated funds have a multitude of valuable uses.104 The problem was 
that this argument also did not seem quite right. In fact, the dissent pointed out 
several different ways in which information could be used.105 
The “in connection with” requirement was not the only hurdle the 
O’Hagan majority had to overcome. The Court also needed to figure out how 
to reconcile the misappropriation theory with the Santa Fe holding that Rule 
10b-5 required more than a mere breach of fiduciary duty. The O’Hagan 
majority hung its hat on the fact that in Santa Fe there was complete disclosure, 
whereas there was none in O’Hagan.106 But under the traditional reading of the 
doctrine of fraudulent non-disclosure, this argument does not withstand 
scrutiny.107 To be sure, in Santa Fe the majority shareholders had, pursuant to 
the federal proxy rules, disclosed a significant amount of information about the 
transaction that the company was engaged in, the freeze-out merger.108 The 
problem, however, is that the underlying transaction information was irrelevant 
 
interpreted O’Hagan to mean that the coincidence test is not a necessary condition for satisfying the 
“in connection with” element. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(opining that the coincidence test was not met in a misappropriation-based tipper-tippee case but 
finding that that was not the only available test). 
 102. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 103. See id. at 656 (majority opinion) (holding that confidential information pertaining to publicly 
traded companies ordinarily derives its value from its utility in securities trading). 
 104. See id. (“The [misappropriation] theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving 
confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information 
through securities transactions.”). 
 105. See id. at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In this case, for example, upon learning of Grand 
Met’s confidential takeover plans, O’Hagan could have done any number of things with the 
information: He could have sold it to a newspaper for publication; he could have given or sold the 
information to Pillsbury itself; or he could even have kept the information and used it solely for his 
personal amusement, perhaps in a fantasy stock trading game.” (citations omitted)). 
 106. See id. at 655 (majority opinion). 
 107. The traditional reading is the one adopted by the Chiarella Court and embodied in the 
Restatement of Torts, to which the Chiarella Court cited. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
227–28 (1980) (“At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon 
the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose material information prior to the 
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to 
disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1976))). 
 108. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977). 
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to the Court’s theory in O’Hagan, which was premised on the non-disclosure of 
the breach itself.109 Moreover, the underlying transaction information in 
O’Hagan—the information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer—was, 
in fact, disclosed to the parties to whom James O’Hagan owed fiduciary duties: 
his firm and the firm’s client, Grand Met. After all, it was their information. 
Of course, it is true that there was something that was not disclosed in O’Hagan—
the fact that James O’Hagan breached his fiduciary duties to his principals. But 
that information was also concealed in Santa Fe—the majority shareholder 
never admitted to the minority that it had breached a duty. 
One novel possibility is that the distinction between O’Hagan and Santa 
Fe actually has something to do with the brazen fiduciary problem discussed 
previously.110 If disclosure of an intent to trade in breach of a fiduciary duty 
allows the brazen fiduciary to avoid liability, then maybe disclosure of more 
circumstantial evidence of the breach might yield the same result, even though 
the breach itself has not been disclosed in so many words. This situation is the 
“halfhearted fiduciary” example mentioned in the introduction to this Article.111 
On the one hand, it makes some sense of the cases, considering that the 
fiduciaries in Santa Fe disclosed a significant amount of information concerning 
the underlying freeze-out transaction.112 And, therefore, the defendants there 
look like halfhearted fiduciaries in this sense. On the other hand, this distinction 
runs into the same problem as the brazen fiduciary scenario—it is hard to 
explain why any disclosure, halfhearted or brazen, should allow the fiduciary to 
avoid liability. 
While the contractual fraud theory has an answer, for now, it suffices to 
say that the O’Hagan Court’s adoption of the misappropriation theory marked 
a revolutionary new turn in the development of insider trading jurisprudence. 
However, the majority’s attempts to overcome the two major hurdles to the 
misappropriation theory were of questionable success. Its discussion of the 
statute’s “in connection with” requirement seemed to lack a limiting principle, 
and its attempt to reconcile the facts of O’Hagan with those of Santa Fe seemed 
facile at best.113 
 
 109. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory 
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he 
plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) 
violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty 
of loyalty.”). 
 110. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466. 
 113. See Painter et al., supra note 18, at 186 (“The O’Hagan Court struggles with the Santa Fe 
problem but does not satisfactorily resolve it. Only by ignoring the Santa Fe Court’s warning about 
immersing Section 10(b) jurisprudence in state fiduciary duty law can the O’Hagan Court reconcile 
itself to the misappropriation theory’s equating of fiduciary breach with ‘deception.’”). 
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The contractual fraud theory, however, breathes new life into the O’Hagan 
majority’s arguments on both counts. The theory supports the majority’s 
argument that an embezzlement of money is different, in a legally significant 
way, from the embezzlement of information.114 Further, the contractual fraud 
theory helps reconcile O’Hagan and Santa Fe using the much-criticized 
reasoning of the O’Hagan majority itself.115 No extant theory of insider trading 
accomplishes that task. But before we delve into the different theories of insider 
trading, and the contractual fraud theory in particular, let us first consider 
O’Hagan’s aftermath. 
4.  The SEC’s Rule 10b5-2 
The O’Hagan opinion opened new frontiers in insider trading law. At the 
same time, it created a list of unanswered questions.116 At the top of that list was 
whether—and if so, under what circumstances—the misappropriation theory 
might apply to relationships that are not strictly fiduciary in character.117 What 
if, for example, James O’Hagan was not a fiduciary of Grand Met but instead 
the counterparty to an important commercial contract with the company? 
Assume further that, in the course of that relationship, O’Hagan discovered the 
information about Grand Met’s planned Pillsbury tender offer. If O’Hagan 
used that information to trade in Pillsbury stock, would he be liable for insider 
trading under the misappropriation theory? What if the contract did not 
mention anything about needing to keep information confidential? What if it 
did? What if the contract went further, containing an agreement not only 
prohibiting the information’s disclosure but also barring its use? 
Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding these questions, the SEC, in 
response to O’Hagan, promulgated Rule 10b5-2 in an attempt to offer greater 
clarity.118 This rule provides that trading on information subject to a promise of 
confidentiality gives rise to liability under O’Hagan. Although district courts in 
 
 114. See infra Section I.C.5. 
 115. See infra Section I.C.5. 
 116. See, e.g., Pritchard, Agency Law and Powell’s Legacy, supra note 77, at 43–46; Larry E. Ribstein, 
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 136–39 (1998). 
 117. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1634 (“Does a duty to disclose 
to the information’s source arise before trading in all fiduciary relationships?”); Hazen, supra note 12, 
at 894 (“The essence of the misappropriation theory is the existence of a fiduciary or other relationship 
that imposes a duty not to trade on confidential information obtained by reason of such relationship. 
The existence of that duty triggers the concomitant disclose or abstain obligation, violation of which 
results in trading liability. The relevant decisions reveal serious problems in trying to identify the 
relationships sufficient to implicate the misappropriation theory.”); Painter et al., supra note 18, at 191 
(“Unfortunately, the scope of fiduciary duties, particularly outside the traditional corporate insider 
context, is far from clear.”); Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court 
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1209 (1997) (“[T]he Court 
did not explain the scope of fiduciary relationships or the nature of the applicable law.”). 
 118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2019). 
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many circuits have deferred to this interpretation of O’Hagan,119 others have 
pushed back.120 Of those in this latter group, one court has held that a non-use 
agreement is a minimum requirement for misappropriation-based insider 
trading liability.121 Other courts have held that the misappropriation theory 
requires a traditional fiduciary duty.122 
The bottom line is that there is considerable confusion in the lower courts 
as to the scope of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 after O’Hagan. As 
explained in greater detail in Part II, the contractual fraud theory cuts through 
this confusion. The theory implies that, although courts should not be able to 
apply the O’Hagan rule to arm’s-length contracts regardless of whether they 
contain confidentiality or non-use agreements, the SEC should. Additionally, 
it implies that courts should probably be able to apply, without an SEC 
rulemaking, the O’Hagan rule to what are referred to as “hybrid agreements,” 
which include joint ventures and strategic alliances.123 But before we consider 
how the contractual fraud theory accomplishes all of this, let us first make sure 
that we appreciate the current messiness in the law of insider trading. 
5.  Lower Court Cases 
The uncertainty over the scope of insider trading liability in the wake of 
O’Hagan created varied results in the lower courts and a circuit split in the courts 
of appeals. Consider how the law would treat the following six scenarios. For 
further context, illustrations are included in the footnotes. The table uses 




Table 1. Approaches to Rule 10b-5’s Application to Insider Trading: 
The Courts 
Scenario Possibly Subject to 
Rule 10b-5 
Supreme Court 




1: Brazen Fiduciary124 No No 
2: Halfhearted Fiduciary125 No No 
3: Contract with Non-Use 
Provision126 
Undetermined Split 
4: Contract with 
Confidentiality Provision127 
Undetermined Split 
5: Unaffiliated Thief 128 No No129 
6: Unaffiliated Innocent 
Acquirer130 
No No 
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The question is, as a legal matter, which of these scenarios are subject to 
Rule 10b-5? The Supreme Court has only clearly weighed in on three of them, 
finding that there is no liability in the first,131 fifth,132 and sixth cases.133 The 
Court’s insider trading jurisprudence also arguably implies that there should be 
no liability in the second case.134 
 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 892 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729 (E.D. Pa. 2012); SEC v. Nothern, 
598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Mass. 2009); SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 120. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“The agreement, 
however, must consist of more than an express or implied promise merely to keep information 
confidential. It must also impose on the party who receives the information the legal duty to refrain 
from trading on or otherwise using the information for personal gain. With respect to confidential 
information, nondisclosure and non-use are logically distinct.” (citation omitted)), vacated on other 
grounds, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (questioning, albeit implicitly, the validity of Rule 10b5-2, the adoption of which post-dated the 
facts of the case by concluding that the confidential relationship at issue in the case did not give rise to 
liability under the statute even though it would under the SEC’s rule), aff’d, 95 F. App’x 857 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 121. See, e.g., Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 122. See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d, at 1014–15; see also 
Bainbridge, Post-Fiduciary Duty Era, supra note 43, at 86–87 (relying on United States v. Chestman to 
argue that O’Hagan requires, if not a traditional fiduciary relationship, then at the very least its 
functional equivalent); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–24 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Gradual Demise] (criticizing Rule 10b5-2 on 
the ground that it is inconsistent with the emphasis of Supreme Court precedent on a fiduciary-like 
relationship). 
 123. See infra notes 248–59 and accompanying text. 
 124. Brazen Fiduciary—Imagine a lawyer whose client is the acquirer in a merger that has not yet 
been disclosed to the market. By virtue of his position as the acquirer’s lawyer, the lawyer knows that 
the price of the target firm’s stock will increase significantly once the deal is announced. The lawyer 
purchases stock in the target company and does indeed make a windfall once the merger is announced. 
Before doing so, however, he notifies his client of his intent to trade. 
 125. Halfhearted Fiduciary—The same facts apply as the brazen fiduciary scenario, except in this 
situation, instead of providing his client with notice of his clear intent to trade, the lawyer provides 
circumstantial evidence of his intent, for example a copy of a bank statement showing the transfer of a 
significant amount of funds. 
 126. Contract with Non-Use Provision—Imagine a supplier of that same acquiring company. The 
supplier is subject to a confidentiality agreement with the acquirer. The supplier trades on the 
information from the acquirer. 
 127. Contract with Confidentiality Provision—Imagine the same facts, but this time a 
confidentiality agreement replaces the non-use provision. 
 128. Unaffiliated Thief—Imagine that the supplier has no agreement whatsoever with the acquirer 
or the target but obtains the information through theft and then profits by trading on it. 
 129. Note that the Second Circuit in Dorozhko is an exception to the general rule. See SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 130. Unaffiliated Innocent Acquirer—Imagine the same facts as the unaffiliated thief, but the 
supplier comes into possession of the acquirer’s information because he overhears it at lunch. 
 131. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). 
 132. See id. at 662; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
 133. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983). 
 134. Compare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475, 479 (1977) (holding that a breach 
of fiduciary duties that, although not disclosed, is nevertheless inferable from other disclosure does not 
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The first scenario, the brazen fiduciary, asks whether there is Rule 10b-5 
liability where the trade breaches a fiduciary duty but is not concealed. The 
Court answered that question in the negative in United States v. O’Hagan.135 
James O’Hagan’s liability was premised on the fact that he concealed the breach 
of his underlying duty of loyalty from his law firm and the firm’s client, Grand 
Met.136 The O’Hagan majority was careful to point out that if he had notified 
his principals of the breach, the result would have been different.137 In other 
words, there is no liability for the brazen fiduciary. 
The second scenario, the halfhearted fiduciary, is far less obvious. It asks 
whether there is similarly no liability for the halfhearted fiduciary, that is to 
say, a fiduciary who, unlike his brazen counterpart, does not disclose the breach 
in so many words but instead discloses circumstantial evidence making it easier 
for the principals to uncover it. There is a good argument that this is the only 
principled way of distinguishing Santa Fe and O’Hagan. Santa Fe effectively 
involves a halfhearted fiduciary—the majority shareholders disclosed all of the 
material information concerning the freeze-out, allowing the minority to allege 
a fiduciary breach. The reason this reading remains novel is likely because it 
suffers from the same infirmities of the brazen fiduciary—it is far from obvious 
why one should be able to escape liability simply by making it easier for the 
principal to uncover the breach.138 The contractual fraud theory supplies an 
answer to that question and therefore helps reconcile Santa Fe and O’Hagan. 
The fifth scenario, the unaffiliated thief, addresses whether there is Rule 
10b-5 liability when the trade is made on the basis of stolen information.139 The 
clear implication of Supreme Court precedent is that there is no liability in that 
scenario.140 It is worth noting that, in SEC v. Dorozhko,141 the Second Circuit has 
challenged this precedent, extending liability to a hacker in the absence of a 
contractual or fiduciary relationship142 in a case where the district court opined 
that finding liability “would . . . undo decades of Supreme Court precedent.”143 
 
give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5), with O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (holding that a concealed breach 
of fiduciary duties gives rise to liability under Rule 10b-5). 
 135. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. 
 136. See id. at 654. 
 137. See id. at 655. 
 138. In Santa Fe, the defendants had shared with the plaintiffs the results of an appraisal that 
appraised the assets in question at a much higher price than the one they were offering. See Santa Fe, 
430 U.S. at 467. Since the defendants were not actually disclosing a fiduciary breach, but were arguably 
disclosing relevant evidence of one, this resembles the halfhearted fiduciary example. See id. 
 139. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2009); see also supra notes 2–8 and 
accompanying text. 
 140. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980). 
 141. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 49–51. 
 143. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
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Even those commentators who would favor liability as a policy matter in these 
scenarios take issue with the Second Circuit’s approach in Dorozhko.144 
The sixth scenario, the unaffiliated innocent acquirer, asks whether there 
is Rule 10b-5 liability when the trader has neither a fiduciary nor contractual 
relationship with the source of the information (or other traders in the 
marketplace for that matter) and obtains the information innocently. The Court 
answered that question in the negative in Dirks v. SEC.145 Dirks raised the issue 
of tipper-tippee liability: Under what circumstances is there liability where 
someone shares material nonpublic information with a third-party who trades 
on it? Because tipper-tippee liability is a species of derivative liability—liability 
that derives from primary liability—the case was also about the nature of 
primary liability in an insider trading case. The SEC argued for a rule that 
would have created liability for a tippee who receives “inside information from 
an insider.”146 In other words, the SEC proposed “the idea that the antifraud 
provisions require equal information among all traders.”147 However, the 
Supreme Court rejected this proposed rule on the grounds that it was 
inconsistent with Chiarella148 and risked inhibiting market analysts’ attempts to 
ferret out information.149 
Beyond these four scenarios, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on 
the other issues reflected in the hypotheticals above. That task has instead fallen 
to the lower courts, which have split over liability in these scenarios. The field 
is complicated by the fact that the SEC itself has weighed in, through the 
adoption of Rule 10b5-2, which would result in liability in the third and fourth 
cases.150 One might reasonably ask why Rule 10b5-2 does not in effect settle—
once and for all—the disagreements among the lower courts, even among these 
scenarios where the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in. The answer is because 
the lower courts are not in agreement that Rule 10b5-2 is a valid exercise of the 
 
 144. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION § 6:14, Westlaw (database updated April 2019) (noting that Dorozhko poses the question 
of whether a new approach to insider trading ought to be recognized but opining that profiting from 
stolen information “plainly threatens market integrity”); Nagy, Reframing Misappropriation, supra note 
7, at 1253 (doubting that securities trading by a computer hacker who unlawfully gains access to 
confidential information would violate Section 10(b)); Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its 
Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 296 (1999) (arguing 
that “from a traditional point of view” hacking-and-trading is not covered by insider trading laws but 
advancing policy reasons for finding liability). 
 145. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 146. Id. at 655. 
 147. Id. at 657. 
 148. See id. at 657 (interpreting Chiarella as holding that “only some persons, under some 
circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information”). 
 149. See id. at 658. 
 150. 17 C.F.R. § 10b5-2 (2019).	 Under Rule 10b5-2, there must be a confidentiality agreement 
between the source of the information and the recipient. Id. Because the fifth and sixth hypotheticals 
do not involve an agreement at all, Rule 10b5-2 would not apply. 
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SEC’s rulemaking authority under the Exchange Act.151 Consider how the lower 
courts have ruled in each of these remaining hypotheticals. 
The third scenario, involving a contractual non-use provision, asks 
whether there should be Rule 10b-5 liability when the trader, in breach of a non-
use provision, fails to disclose his trading on information obtained from a 
contractual counterparty. Most lower courts that have considered the issue have 
held that there is Rule 10b-5 liability under these facts.152 The Second and Ninth 
Circuits take a different approach. They have held that that Rule 10b-5 liability 
only arises in the context of a fiduciary relationship or its “functional 
equivalent.”153 For these courts, Rule 10b5-2 is invalid to the extent that it 
extends liability beyond these fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary contexts.154 Several 
commentators agree with this approach.155 
 
 151. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
 152. See United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2014) (implicit confidentiality 
agreement between friends and members of the same Alcoholics Anonymous group); SEC v. Cuban, 
620 F.3d 551, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2010) (confidentiality agreement in the context of a stock purchase); 
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) (confidentiality agreement between a married 
couple). 
 153. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. 
Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2002). To be sure, Chestman was decided prior to the 
promulgation of Rule 10b5-2 and it is not entirely clear how the Second Circuit would view the validity 
of that rule in light of their prior holding that a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship is necessary. 
The District Court for the Northern District of California in Kim interpreted the fiduciary or fiduciary-
like requirement as a constraint on the validity of Rule 10b5-2. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1015. In other 
words, the holding of Kim is that the SEC’s rule is only valid to the extent that it applies to such 
relationships. Id. In dicta in Chestman, the Second Circuit seemed to imply that a mere contractual 
duty of confidentiality might be a fiduciary-like relationship sufficient to give rise to insider trading 
liability. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569–70. At least one district court in the Second Circuit has read 
Chestman that way. See United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). However, 
it’s not how everyone reads the case. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Post-Fiduciary Duty Era, supra note 43, at 91. 
It is true that, in a more recent case, the Second Circuit has extended Rule 10b-5 liability to non-
fiduciary cases. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). Yet, there, the court drew a 
distinction between the traditional fraudulent non-disclosure cases—like Chiarella, O’Hagan, and 
Chestman—and an affirmative representation case—like Dorozkho itself. See id. at 48. Dorozhko involved 
the theft of information by a computer hacker who gained access to corporate information through 
what the SEC characterized as a misrepresentation of his identity. See id. at 44. Thus, in the Second 
Circuit at least, a fiduciary relationship does not seem to be required when there is an affirmative 
representation whereas such a relationship, or its functional equivalent, is required with respect to 
fraudulent non-disclosure, which is the traditional way of viewing insider trading under either Chiarella 
or O’Hagan. 
 154. See Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1015. 
 155. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common 
Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151, 190 (2011) (opining that 
“the SEC may have exceeded the constitutional bounds of its authority with Rule 10b5-2”); Ray J. 
Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading Violations, 51 
CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 492 (2002) (questioning whether Rule 10b5-2 is “outside of the SEC’s authority 
under Rule 10b-5”); Nagy, Gradual Demise, supra note 122, at 1364 (“Rule 10b5-2’s extension of the 
misappropriation theory to breaches of a confidentiality agreement has contributed to the demise of 
fiduciary principles in the law of insider trading. And while O’Hagan’s policy justifications may support 
liability for the wrongful use of such confidential information, O’Hagan’s fiduciary-based framework 
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There is also disagreement among the lower courts over the fourth 
scenario, a contractual confidentiality provision, which asks whether there is 
Rule 10b-5 liability where the trader, in breach of a confidentiality (but not a 
non-use) provision fails to disclose his trading on information obtained from a 
contractual counterparty. In United States v. McGee156 and SEC v. Yun,157 the 
Third and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, held that a confidentiality agreement 
is sufficient to give rise to insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5.158 
In SEC v. Cuban,159 however, a district court in the Fifth Circuit disagreed 
with the Third and Eleventh Circuits, although the reviewing court decided the 
issues on appeal without weighing in on the confidentiality versus non-use 
distinction.160 In Cuban, the district court reasoned that there is no policy 
justification for refusing to extend insider trading liability to the breach of a 
contractual obligation.161 However, the court emphasized that, as a legal matter, 
insider trading must actually constitute a breach of the contract in question.162 
And while insider trading breaches a non-use agreement, in the court’s 
estimation, it did not breach a confidentiality agreement.163 The court further 
concluded that Rule 10b5-2 cannot change this result, presumably because the 
SEC is constrained by the court’s interpretation of the statute.164 
As evidenced by this brief discussion, in the insider trading law firmament, 
there are a few fixed stars and several wandering ones. As for the fixed stars, 
there is generally no insider trading liability for the brazen fiduciary, the 
unaffiliated thief, or the unaffiliated innocent acquirer. It is arguable that there 
is also no liability for the halfhearted fiduciary. Beyond these cases, however, 
the lower courts disagree over basic questions of insider trading liability, 
including whether a fiduciary relationship is a necessary condition for liability 
and, if not, whether a non-use provision (in addition to a confidentiality 
agreement) is required. This state of affairs is partly attributable to the fact that 
there is not a theory of insider trading that fully answers these questions. If 
there were a theory that could account for the fixed stars, then perhaps it could 
 
militates against it.”); Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A 
Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 647 (2001) (interpreting Chestman as requiring 
a fiduciary-like duty and therefore questioning whether Rule 10b5-2, in overturning that decision, will 
be upheld). 
 156. 763 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2014) 
 157. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) 
 158. McGee, 763 F.3d at 314; Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73.  
 159. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 620 
F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 160. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2010) (reading the complaint as alleging the 
existence of a non-use agreement between plaintiff and defendant). 
 161. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 724. 
 162. See id. at 728. 
 163. See id. at 725. 
 164. See id. at 729. 
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also resolve the confusion regarding the wandering ones. There are several 
possible theories to offer. The problem, however, is that not one of them does 
the necessary work. 
Possible Theories 
Before discussing the extant theories of insider trading law, it might be 
helpful to address a preliminary question: what exactly is meant by theories of 
insider trading law? What I do not mean is what litigators might refer to as the 
theory of the case in an insider trading litigation—or at least not merely that. 
That is to say, by the term “theory,” I do not simply mean an explanation for 
why insider trading gives rise to liability under the statute. Instead, as used 
here, “theory” means a coherent explanation for what insider trading law is 
really about, taking into account Rule 10b-5’s crucial role in anchoring this body 
of law. 
There have been many different attempts to advance insider trading 
“theories” in this broad sense. All of these extant theories can be placed in one 
of three categories: fiduciary-based, property-based, or unjust enrichment-
based theories. These qualify as theories as they each—in the broadest sense—
seek to answer the question posed above: What is insider trading really about? 
For the fiduciary-based theories, it is about enforcing fiduciary obligations. For 
the property-based theories, it is about protecting property, particularly 
informational property. For the unjust enrichment-based theories, it is about 
fairness. Unfortunately, none of these theories can fully explain the body of law 
as it exists. 
1.  Fiduciary Theory 
One possible theory of insider trading law is that the law does and should 
focus on insider trading by those in entrusted165 or, in other words, fiduciary, or 
fiduciary-like, positions in light of the unique costs of insider trading in this 
context. These costs include the costs resulting from the distortion of the 
incentives of the entrusted agent; the costs associated with the time and 
attention the agent spends on engaging in insider trading; and the costs 
associated with the loss in the perception of legitimacy of such entrusted agent 
as a result of insider trading.166 
One can see a fiduciary-based theory at work in a case like Chiarella. There, 
insider trading liability is premised on the failure of a fiduciary to disclose 
information to his principal when engaged in a transaction with the principal.167 
 
 165. Kim, supra note 14, at 960–61. 
 166. See id. at 961–67. 
 167. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980). 
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Why a fiduciary and not someone else? Presumably because the Court believes 
that the costs of insider trading by the fiduciary are that much more significant. 
2.  Property Theory 
Another theory of insider trading law is that the law does and should focus 
on protecting quasi-property rights in information in order to incentivize 
socially desirable activities on the part of the information producer.168 Under 
this theory, information is a public good, which means that it is difficult to 
exclude people from consuming it once it is produced (i.e., it is nonexcludable) 
and it is never used up in the course of consuming it (i.e., it is non-rivalrous).169 
Because of these characteristics, it is difficult for producers of information to 
recoup their costs of production in the absence of property rights.170 Therefore, 
if left to the market, information, like other public goods, is likely to be 
underproduced.171 Because firms produce a lot of information that is not 
protected by intellectual property law, they need some other source of law—
insider trading law—to protect that information.172 Such protection comes in 
the form of a property right prohibiting others from using the information.173 
The implication of this theory is that such right can then be assigned through 
contract. 
3.  Unjust Enrichment 
An alternative theory of insider trading law is that the law does, and 
should, reflect unjust enrichment principles. In other words, the defendant must 
“give back that which he obtained by invasion of the plaintiff’s interest whether 
or not that gain equals the plaintiff’s loss.”174 Under an unjust enrichment view 
of insider trading law, the court asks whether the defendant incurred a benefit 
and whether retention of the benefit would be wrongful. This theory likely 
would not lead to a liability outcome that is different from that of the fiduciary 
 
 168. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1606–07. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. One can imagine a number of such examples: information regarding a planned corporate 
takeover that, if disclosed prematurely, will increase the cost to the acquirer of proceeding with the 
transaction; information about a planned corporate restructuring that will be politically controversial 
and, if not disclosed in a context-specific way, will impose significant reputational (and other) costs on 
the corporation; or information about a new project that, at the moment, is so speculative that it cannot 
be patented but that, if disclosed even at this early point in time, might make it difficult for the 
company to beat out its competition in the research and development race. None of the information in 
the foregoing examples is protected under intellectual property law. Yet, the firm producing this 
information would be harmed in the absence of property rights, and this harm is likely to have adverse 
ex ante effects. 
 173. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1607–08. 
 174. Thompson, supra note 15, at 393. 
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theory,175 but it might lead to different remedies. In particular, the unjust 
enrichment theory would view the defendant’s gain as a “natural built-in limit 
which prevents draconian liability for the defendant.”176 
How Well Do the Extant Theories Stack Up? 
Although these are all plausible theories of how insider trading law might 
work in the abstract, they are not plausible theories of how insider trading law 
appears to work in practice under Rule 10b-5. 
1.  Explaining the Positive Law 
The first reason these extant theories are not plausible under Rule 10b-5 
is that they do not effectively explain Supreme Court precedent—those fixed 
stars in the insider trading firmament discussed previously.177 Therefore, they 
cannot be relied upon to help us resolve the wandering stars: the various circuit 
splits. To see this, let us revisit our table of hypothetical scenarios from 
before,178 but this time we will append to that table the liability outcomes that 
would likely result from applying the various extant theories discussed above to 
those hypothetical scenarios.   
 
 175. See id. at 391–92 (discussing liability in terms of the fiduciary theory). 
 176. Id. at 393. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65. 
 178. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2. Approaches to Rule 10b-5’s Applications to Insider Trading:  
The Courts and the Extant Theories 












No182 No Yes Yes Yes 
2: Halfhearted 
Fiduciary 
No183 No Yes Yes Yes 
3: Contract with 
Non-Use 
Provision 
Undecided Split184 No Yes Yes 
4: Contract with 
Confidentiality 
Provision 
Undecided Split185 No Yes Yes 
5: Unaffiliated 
Thief 
No186 No No Yes Yes 
 
 179. The fiduciary theory requires the breach of a fiduciary duty for purposes of Rule 10b-5 liability 
and therefore would not result in liability in cases like scenarios 3, 4, 5, and 6 where there is no such 
duty. Because one cannot avoid the breach of a fiduciary duty by providing notice of one’s breach, these 
facts do not eliminate liability under the fiduciary theory in scenarios 1 and 2. 
 180. Under the property rights theory, trading on someone else’s information is akin to stealing, 
and therefore under this theory, there would be liability under all of the above scenarios. 
 181. Under the unjust enrichment theory, the defendant must be unjustly enriched to attract 
liability, which is the case in all of the scenarios except scenario 6, the unaffiliated innocent acquirer. 
 182. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647, 676 (1997). 
 183. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 184. Compare United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that Rule 10b-5 
liability arises from a mere relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, 
or practice of sharing confidences), SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
Rule 10b-5 liability would arise from the breach of a non-use provision), and SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 
1263, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere relationship, 
whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences), with 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (requiring the breach of a 
fiduciary relationship or its “functional equivalent” for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5), and 
United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (requiring the breach of a fiduciary 
relationship or its “functional equivalent” for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5). 
 185. Compare McGee, 763 F.3d at 314 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), and Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), with SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that Rule 
10b-5 liability can be premised on a contractual duty but requires something more than a confidentiality 
provision). 
 186. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33, 235 (1980); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
at 647. 
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Both the property and unjust enrichment theories have a particularly 
difficult time explaining the results that the Supreme Court has reached. Under 
the property theory, insider trading is akin to conversion. Therefore, it should 
give rise to liability for any unauthorized trading, regardless of whether that 
trading is innocent, disclosed (either brazenly of halfheartedly), or the result of 
theft. For this reason, under the property theory, there would be liability in all 
of the above cases.  
The same is true of the unjust enrichment theory, except for the fact that 
it would absolve one of liability where the enrichment from the trade is not 
“unjust,” as would be the case for the unaffiliated innocent acquirer. Thus, the 
unjust enrichment theory does a little better than the property theory in 
explaining these results, but neither theory does a particularly good job. Nor do 
these theories sufficiently explain Rule 10b5-2 itself, which is premised on a 
contractual relationship and therefore cuts across property and fairness 
concerns. Thus, the property and unjust enrichment theories lack explanatory 
power when it comes to the Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence and 
Rule 10b5-2. 
The fiduciary theory does not fare much better. If insider trading law is to 
focus on “the use of an entrusted position for self-regarding gain,”188 then one 
would expect to see courts extending Rule 10b-5 liability to any breach of the 
duty of loyalty, regardless of whether there is disclosure of the breach or not. 
And therefore the fiduciary theory does not fully explain the results in the first 
or second scenario in table 2 above. 
2.  The Purpose of 10b-5 
The failure of these theories to explain the shape of the law is a symptom 
of a larger problem. Under these theories, the fact that insider trading law under 
Rule 10b-5 is based on fraud is an unfortunate anomaly that gets in the way of 
how things actually should be in an ideal world.189 Nor do these theories really 
explain why Rule 10b-5 exists in the first place.190 In other words, these various 
 
 187. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58, 665 (1983). 
 188. Kim, supra note 14, at 934. 
 189. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 190. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“It must be noted, however, that, although the [property-based] rationale 
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theories are difficult to reconcile with the fraud-based language of the text of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
3.  Federalism Concerns 
Additionally, if Rule 10b-5 is really about property, fiduciary duty law, or 
unjust enrichment, there is a concern about what effect incorporating these 
common law categories into federal law might have on the common law itself.191 
This concern is at the heart of the federalism issues raised by many 
commentators who criticize the Court’s adoption of the misappropriation 
theory in O’Hagan.192 The concern is that liability under O’Hagan would attach 
not only to traditional fiduciary relationships but also to other fiduciary-like 
relationships as well.193 Moreover, the court would have to determine which 
obligations apply to such fiduciary-like relationships.194 Thus, the federalization 
of fiduciary duty law would likely affect not only the domain but also the 
content of fiduciary duty law.195 As a consequence, federal securities law would 
drive these determinations. 
4.  Making Sense of O’Hagan 
Under these theories, the misappropriation theory articulated in O’Hagan 
just does not make sense. From the perspective of the fiduciary-based or unjust 
enrichment-based theories, it is difficult to explain why the source of the 
information should be able to authorize the insider trading, which the 
misappropriation theory allows.196 True, the property-based theory has an easier 
 
. . . provides a policy for prohibiting a specific kind of insider trading, any obvious relationship to 
Section 10(b) is presently missing because theft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen of the 
prohibition . . . . Nevertheless, the law is far enough down this road . . . that a court of appeals has no 
option but to continue the route.”). 
 191. Indeed, this concern is implicit in the Santa Fe Court’s warning against section 10(b) 
jurisprudence in state fiduciary-duty law. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 
(1977). 
 192. See Painter et al., supra note 18, at 186–87; Ribstein, supra note 116, at 158, 171. 
 193. See Painter et al., supra note 18, at 186–87; Ribstein, supra note 116, at 167. 
 194. See Painter et al., supra note 18, at 187; Ribstein, supra note 116, at 167–69. 
 195. See Painter et al., supra note 18, at 186–87; Ribstein, supra note 116, at 169–71. 
 196. Admittedly, this assumes that fiduciary duties are not waivable. This is clearly true of 
corporate law but not true of other domains like the law of limited liability companies. As to the 
normative desirability of waivable fiduciary duties, there is disagreement. Compare FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8–10, 
91–93 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE], Henry N. Butler & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 29 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he critical point to understand under the contract theory is that 
fiduciary duties are not distinct from the contract but are simply one of many drafting alternatives”), 
and Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 
(1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Fiduciary Duty] (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties 
. . . . Actual contracts always prevail over implied ones.”), with Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance: 
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1414–15, 1414 n.29 (1985), John C. 
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time explaining this feature of the misappropriation theory.197 But none of these 
theories, including the property theory, explains the brazen fiduciary problem—
the fact that under O’Hagan, a trader should be able to avoid liability simply by 
giving notice to the information source of an intent to trade on the source’s 
information.198 
5.  Reconciling Santa Fe and O’Hagan 
Finally, none of these theories provides a satisfactory way to reconcile 
Santa Fe and O’Hagan. The challenge lies in explaining why there is liability in 
the latter case but not the former. With one exception, none of the extant 
theories provide any help here. Furthermore, the one exception—the property 
theory—has a number of other shortcomings. 
Recall that in Santa Fe the Court held that Rule 10b-5 requires actual fraud, 
meaning that the breach of a fiduciary duty, with nothing more, fails to give 
rise to insider trading liability under the rule.199 And yet, in O’Hagan, it seemed 
that, as a basis for holding James O’Hagan liable under Rule 10b-5, there was 
little more than a breach of the duty of confidentiality he owed to his firm and 
his firm’s client, Grand Met.200 
How does one reconcile these results? Neither the unjust enrichment 
theory nor the fiduciary theory help, as each would require liability in both 
cases. Assuming the factual accuracy of the plaintiffs’ allegations in Santa Fe, 
those allegations would spell out a case of unjust enrichment and a breach of 
fiduciary duty. The same could be said of O’Hagan. Therefore, under the unjust 
enrichment and fiduciary duty theories, there would be liability in both cases, 
which is not what actually happened. 
It is true that the property theory does a better job generating the observed 
results. After all, in O’Hagan, there is clearly a conversion of property, 
assuming, as the property theory does, that Rule 10b-5 vests property rights in 
 
Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of 
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 972–74 (1988), and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554–55, 1597 (1989). This debate plays out not just in 
corporate law but across the fiduciary duty spectrum. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: 
Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 68–69 (2005). 
 197. The reason is that property should be alienable, and therefore if insider trading law confers 
property rights in information to information sources, then that right should be alienable. See, e.g., 
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1645; Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, 
supra note 11, at 1323 (noting that the duty in O’Hagan is contractual and that this development “pleases 
those who see the insider trading prohibition largely as a corporate property protection mechanism”). 
 198. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). 
 199. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1977). 
 200. See, e.g., Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note 11, at 1323 (“But notwithstanding a 
respectful bow to the earlier decision, it renders Santa Fe of minimal significance given that very few 
breaches of fiduciary duty are ever done brazenly. There is almost always some element of 
concealment.”). 
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information. By contrast, in Santa Fe there is no conversion, even if one takes 
the plaintiffs’ allegations as true. But the property theory has other problems, 
documented previously, including that it has a hard time explaining the rest of 
insider trading jurisprudence.201 
More fundamentally, however, none of these theories, including the 
property theory, helps us understand the O’Hagan majority’s own apparent 
rationale for distinguishing the two cases. The O’Hagan majority seems to say 
that Rule 10b-5 applies because of James O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his breach 
to his principal.202 This raises two questions. First, it is not clear why a concealed 
breach from our earlier scenarios constitutes fraud and what the limiting 
principle is there.203 Second, taking the majority’s fraud theory as a given, it is 
not clear why that same theory does not result in fraud in Santa Fe. After all, 
the corporate executives in Santa Fe might have disclosed the information 
regarding the freeze-out to their shareholders. But they certainly did not 
disclose that they were breaching a fiduciary duty, which was, after all, the 
source of liability in O’Hagan. In other words, the O’Hagan majority seems to 
be saying that a defendant can avoid liability not only by disclosing the actual 
breach but also by disclosing underlying facts that would make it easier for the 
plaintiff to discover that breach. This is the “halfhearted fiduciary” case, which 
arguably reconciles the two cases.204 Yet, if this is how we reconcile the two 
cases, none of these theories explain why a halfhearted fiduciary should be able 
to avoid liability. 
Conclusion: The Extant Theories Do Not Stack Up Well 
The extant theories of Rule 10b-5-based insider trading law have a difficult 
time explaining the jurisprudence: they do not explain why Rule 10b-5 is 
necessary instead of relying only on state law;205 they raise significant federalism 
concerns;206 they have a difficult time making sense of the rule that the Court 
 
 201. See supra Sections I.C.1–2. 
 202. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (“In contrast to the Government’s allegations in this case, in Santa 
Fe Industries, all pertinent facts were disclosed by the persons charged with violating § 10(b) and Rule 
10b–5; therefore, there was no deception through nondisclosure to which liability under those 
provisions could attach. Similarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: 
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source 
of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic 
information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-
turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.” (citations omitted)). 
 203. The closest the common law comes to saying that the breach of a duty—other than a duty to 
disclose—constitutes fraud is the doctrine of promissory fraud, which requires the promisor to intend 
to breach contemporaneous with making the promise. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7. 
 205. See supra Section I.C.2. 
 206. See supra Section I.C.3. 
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develops in O’Hagan;207 and they cannot explain the rationale the O’Hagan 
Court offers to distinguish that case from Santa Fe.208 
By contrast, the contractual fraud theory addresses all of these concerns. 
It does a better job than any of these theories in explaining the shape of the law. 
It does not treat the statute’s basis in fraud as an inconvenient truth and instead 
views it as central to the problem at issue: how to address, through contract, the 
fact that insider trading is a breach that is hard to detect. For this reason, the 
contractual fraud theory explains the existence of Rule 10b-5. We need Rule 
10b-5 because, without it, the common law does not solve the costly detection 
problem. The contractual fraud theory does not pose the same risks to 
federalism values. Moreover, the rule announced in O’Hagan makes perfect 
sense under the contractual fraud theory. It is only logical that the information 
source should have the right to authorize insider trading. And under the 
contractual fraud theory, the fact that a trader that discloses his intent to trade 
to the source of the information (the so-called brazen fiduciary) is not a 
problem. In fact, it is a feature, not a bug. Finally, the contractual fraud theory 
helps us distinguish Santa Fe from O’Hagan on the basis that the breach in Santa 
Fe was not particularly costly to detect in light of disclosure of the underlying 
facts while the costs of detecting the breach in O’Hagan was significant. 
To develop these arguments, let us first consider the contractual fraud 
theory in greater depth. 
II.  THE CONTRACTUAL FRAUD THEORY 
Overview 
Under the contractual fraud theory, insider trading liability arises 
whenever the trading breaches a duty to report—either explicit or implied by a 
court—which is the violation of an underlying covenant—whether contractual 
or fiduciary-based—that prohibits the insider trading in the first place. This 
failure to report constitutes fraud pursuant to Rule 10b-5 and should therefore 
give rise to the fraud-like, extracompensatory damages provided for by the rule. 
The contractual fraud theory is premised on the notion that insider trading 
is extremely costly to detect for parties wishing to protect their information 
from this impermissible use. Under this theory, insider trading is but one type 
of “costly detection problem.”209 Thus, parties that wish to protect the use of 
their information from insider trading have incentives to reduce these detection 
costs. This is true regardless of whether the relationship between the source and 
 
 207. See supra Section I.C.4. 
 208. See supra Section I.C.5. 
 209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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recipient of the information is contractual or fiduciary.210 Both relationships 
might include a bar on insider trading—a contractual confidentiality or non-use 
provision in the case of the contracting relationship and a duty of loyalty in the 
case of the fiduciary relationship. Call this the “negative insider trading 
covenant.” The problem, however, is that, even with a negative insider trading 
covenant in place, the information source set on protecting his information faces 
steep costs to detecting underlying breaches of that covenant. 
One approach to minimize these detection costs would be to contract for 
“cooperation in recovery.”211 In other words, the information source might 
require the party in receipt of the confidential information to disclose any 
breach of the underlying covenant, whether contractual or fiduciary, that bars 
insider trading.212 This is the “reporting covenant” discussed in the introduction 
to this Article.213 A reporting covenant, at least in theory, lowers detection costs 
by creating an additional source of liability if the information recipient fails to 
inform the information source of a breach of the underlying negative insider 
trading covenant.214 
However, the problem is, as contract scholars have explained, this 
disclosure duty is ineffective if it is enforced with traditional contract 
 
 210. There is an important remedial difference between contract law and fiduciary duty law. 
Whereas the remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages, the remedy for a fiduciary breach 
is disgorgement. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341 (1985). One might think that this remedial 
difference would eliminate the costly detection problem when the underlying non-use provision comes 
from fiduciary, rather than contract, law since the disgorgement amount generally will be greater than 
expectation damages. However, this is not necessarily the case. While it’s true that the fiduciary might 
be marginally less inclined to breach than the contracting party, there is still an incentive to breach if 
he thinks it is unlikely to be caught and if the worst that can happen is a disgorgement of his profits. 
Now, it is true that common law courts will occasionally award punitive damages for certain types of 
fiduciary breaches. However, usually the availability of punitive damages for fiduciary breaches is 
reserved for cases where the harm has a public orientation. See, e.g., Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 
F. Supp. 2d 429, 448–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to 
plaintiff’s punitive damages claims regarding alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and fiduciary 
breaches on the grounds that such allegations do not implicate behavior directed toward the public). 
To be sure, there actually are good arguments as to why insider trading in breach of a duty entails 
public harms, but I am not aware of any cases that have held this with respect to common law fiduciary 
duty claims. Where insider trading claims were brought under state law fiduciary duty claims, the 
penalty is usually just disgorgement. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) 
(holding that insider trading in breach of state fiduciary duty law requires disgorgement of profits). 
 211. This is Gregory Klass’s term. See Klass, supra note 19, at 2. 
 212. An example is Section 5.4 of the ABA’s Model Stock Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”). 
MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT § 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed. 2010). 
 213. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Klass, supra note 19, at 12 (“Such duties[, like the reporting covenant,] make it easier to 
verify whether performance has happened and thereby increase the probability that the promisee will 
be able to prove any breach in court. In addition, such terms can reduce litigation costs (by reducing 
the cost of information to the promisee) and make performance more observable (by telling the 
promisee about it).”). 
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remedies.215 If the promisor fails to report an impermissible use of the 
promisee’s confidential information, the only way the promisee can recover is 
by proving that there was indeed a breach of the negative insider trading 
covenant, the underlying bar on insider trading.216 If there was, then the 
promisor also breached the failure to report that underlying breach.217 But if the 
promisee can prove the underlying breach, then there is no separate harm 
incurred as a result of the breach of the reporting covenant.218 After all, the 
whole point of the reporting covenant is to make it possible for the promisee to 
detect an underlying breach.219 If the promisee is already aware of such breach, 
then there is no additional harm arising from the promisor’s failure to report 
it.220 Consequently, in terms of mere compensatory remedies, the promisee is 
entitled to compensation for the underlying breach but nothing more.221 But 
such compensatory remedies do not impose any additional cost on the promisor. 
Accordingly, when only compensatory damages are available, there is little that 
prevents the promisor from breaching that underlying covenant or duty.222 As 
a result, if enforced with traditional compensatory damages, the reporting 
covenant does not in actuality have much, if any, effect—it does not do anything 
to help the promisee detect the underlying breach. 
The way through this impasse is to award extracompensatory damages of 
the sort available in fraud for breaches of the reporting covenant.223 Then the 
promisor would incur an additional cost for the failure to report the underlying 
breach and, if calculated correctly, the resulting punitive damages could be 
expected to incentivize the promisor to actually report the underlying breach.224 
Additionally, from a legal perspective, it would seem that courts would be 
justified in awarding extracompensatory damages for the breach of a reporting 
covenant. After all, the failure to disclose information while under an obligation 
to do so sounds a lot like classic fraudulent concealment, which, as a species of 
fraud, triggers noncompensatory damages.225 
Thus, in the case of a reporting covenant, it would seem that the policy 
goals and the legal requirements are in alignment—the covenant is only 
effective as a means of lowering the detection costs of a breach involving insider 
 
 215. See id. at 15–27 (arguing that, if the failure to report the violation of an underlying covenant 
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trading if the covenant is enforced with extracompensatory damages. It just so 
happens that, as a legal matter, such damages are warranted in light of the fact 
that the breach of the covenant sounds not just in contract but in fraud as well, 
where extracompensatory damages are warranted. 
However, at common law, courts tend to be skeptical of awarding 
extracompensatory damages even in those cases, like the reporting covenant 
described above, where the parties seem to be contracting for fraud liability.226 
Indeed, courts appear to be particularly reluctant where the fraud is premised 
on non-disclosure in the face of a contractual duty like the one created by the 
reporting covenant.227 The upshot is that, at common law, it is unlikely that 
courts will allow parties to effectively enforce covenants to cooperate in 
recovery, even if the parties specifically opt for extracompensatory damages by 
explicitly contracting for fraud liability. In other words, the common law does 
not help parties address the costly detection problem. 
Rule 10b-5, by contrast, does, or at least that is the claim at the heart of 
the contractual fraud theory. Under this theory, Rule 10b-5 allows parties to do 
something that they cannot do under state law—contract for extracompensatory 
damages for a particular instance of the costly detection problem, insider 
trading. Under Rule 10b-5, if the contract includes a covenant to report the 
breach of a provision prohibiting insider trading, and if the promisor engages 
in insider trading based on confidential information without disclosing it to the 
counterparty, then Rule 10b-5 provides for extracompensatory damages to 
enforce that reporting duty.228 That is the core of the contractual fraud theory 
of insider trading. Moreover, Rule 10b-5 allows these contracting parties to have 
such contract provisions enforced by public enforcement authorities, another 
feature that helps address the costly detection problem by making it more likely 
that such breaches will be detected. Of course, one might wonder why we 
decided to federalize only one type of costly detection problem—insider 
trading—and not others. The answer is that insider trading has potentially 
significant welfare implications and therefore is a comparatively relevant 
subject matter for federal law.229 
Thus, under the contractual fraud theory, Rule 10b-5 allows parties to 
contract for fraud liability whereas they cannot do this at common law (or 
cannot without extreme uncertainty). Where a party engages in insider trading 
 
 226. See Klass, supra note 19, at 45–47. 
 227. Indeed, only a small handful of cases can be located. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 19, at 45 n.99 
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in breach of a reporting covenant, the extracompensatory damages of the federal 
securities laws apply, which, combined with federal enforcement resources, 
lower the detection costs of insider trading. 
Not only can contracting parties explicitly contract for fraud liability 
under the contractual fraud theory, but it also follows that courts (or the SEC) 
should be able to read into contracts implicit elections for such liability. That is 
to say, in certain circumstances, courts (or the SEC) should be able to decide 
that a “negative insider trading covenant”230 is implicitly accompanied by a duty 
to disclose any breach of that underlying covenant. Thus, failure to disclose 
would breach that reporting covenant and trigger Rule 10b-5. 
Before proceeding, a clarification is in order. Up to this point, the 
discussion has explicitly assumed that insider trading’s costly detection problem 
is a problem regardless of whether the underlying bar on insider trading comes 
from a contractual or fiduciary relationship. When reference is made to courts 
interpreting the “contract” between the source of the information and the 
recipient, it is still the assumption that the underlying ban on insider trading is 
coming from a contractual or fiduciary relationship, in particular a 
confidentiality or non-use provision in the case of contract or the duty of loyalty 
in the case of the fiduciary relationship. The question is whether there is an 
implicit contractual overlay that requires a duty to report a breach of that 
underlying contractual or fiduciary duty. In other words, under what 
circumstances should courts (or the SEC) infer such a contractual provision in 
a relationship, whether contractual or fiduciary? 
That question is really one of contract interpretation. And the answer 
depends on whether one thinks that the goal of interpreting the contract is to 
maximize private welfare—in other words, the welfare of just the contracting 
parties themselves—or the welfare of the public more generally.231 I argue below 
that courts should generally take a private-welfare maximizing view but that the 
SEC would be justified in taking a public-welfare maximizing view. 
1.  The Private-Welfare Maximizing View 
From a private-welfare maximizing view, whether the contract should be 
interpreted as containing an implicit provision triggering Rule 10b-5 liability 
for insider trading would turn on a hypothetical bargaining analysis. This is a 
fairly standard way of deciding contract interpretation questions.232 The 
hypothetical bargain analysis asks what the parties themselves were likely to 
 
 230. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 231. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44–45 (Denise Clinton 
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have decided had they considered this issue at the time of contracting.233 In 
other words, what factors govern whether parties will agree to fraud liability for 
enforcing a negative insider trading covenant? 
a. Two Factors 
There are two factors that are particularly relevant: the difficulty of 
detecting the underlying breach and the availability of alternative means for 
enforcing compliance. The more costly it is to detect the underlying breach and 
the less cost effective the alternative means for enforcing compliance, the more 
likely it is that contracting parties will choose (implicitly) to enforce a 
contractual prohibition on insider trading through the fraud liability granted by 
Rule 10b-5. 
i.  Difficulty of Detecting the Underlying Breach 
The contractual fraud theory is premised on the notion that insider trading 
can be regulated through contract law but only if contract law permits parties 
to contract for fraud liability. Insider trading is costly to detect, and attempts 
to use contracts to compel the recipient of confidential information to report 
any insider trading to require something more than compensatory contract 
damages. Thus, the theory is constructed on the fact that insider trading 
presents a costly detection problem. The implication is that if, for whatever 
reason, insider trading in a given case is not costly to detect, then this fact 
should weigh against the applicability of Rule 10b-5 and therefore against the 
court finding an implicit duty to report the insider trading. 
What might lower the costs of detecting the underlying breach of either a 
contractual or fiduciary duty? One possibility is the existence of a separate 
disclosure regime that might help the beneficiary of the contractual or fiduciary 
duty to uncover the breach. In fact, Santa Fe is just such a case.234 There, the 
controlling shareholder was obligated under the proxy rules to provide the 
minority shareholders with expansive disclosure concerning the facts of the 
transaction, management’s interests, and the opinions of the board, accountants, 
and investment bankers, among other things. Indeed, it was this disclosure that 
allowed the minority shareholders to bring the suit in the first place, claiming 
that the transaction was unfair and therefore breached the controlling 
shareholders’ fiduciary duties.235 Thus, Santa Fe provides an example of a case 
where the breach of the underlying duty was not costly to verify in any way 
because of the proxy rules requiring disclosure. This helps explain why the 
Court held that Rule 10b-5 did not apply in that case. 
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ii.  Alternative Means of Enforcing Compliance 
The other consideration is the availability of an alternative means of 
enforcing the promisor’s compliance with the contractual prohibition to engage 
in insider trading. Fraud liability is one way of encouraging compliance with a 
covenant not to engage in insider trading. But it is not the only way. 
One common alternative for encouraging compliance in this context 
involves controlling the flow of information that might lead to insider 
trading.236 Parties can control the flow of information in several ways: by 
refusing to share certain information with contracting counterparties, by 
delaying disclosure of such information until a time when its value as inside 
information is less, or by narrowing the number of intended recipients of the 
information.237 One sees contracting parties employ any or all of these methods 
frequently when they share confidential information that they do not want 
disclosed or used in certain impermissible ways. 
However, these alternative means of enforcing compliance are not as 
readily available in all circumstances. As a general matter, these alternatives are 
probably going to be more cost effective in arm’s-length transactions as opposed 
to within firms. In other words, it is more cost effective for a firm to pursue 
these alternatives when dealing at arm’s length with, let’s say, a supplier than it 
is with the Chief Marketing Officer of the firm itself. That is to say, if a firm 
has sensitive information that it does not want used for insider trading purposes, 
it is easier to refuse to share that information, or delay disclosure of it, to the 
supplier than it is the Chief Marketing Officer. 
The distinction has to do with the fundamentally different nature of the 
two relationships. In the case of the Chief Marketing Officer, the firm is hiring 
his knowledge and expertise for a variety of unspecified, multifaceted problems 
that will persist over an undetermined period of time. In that context, it will be 
difficult to control the flow of information through the means outlined above. 
It is difficult to know what type of information the Chief Marketing Officer 
will need to do his job. And his contacts with other members of the firm will be 
frequent and varied, making it unrealistic as a practical matter of controlling 
information flow in this way. 
This is not true, by contrast, of the supplier in the arm’s-length contract. 
In that case, the transaction is much simpler. The relationship is specific and 
predetermined. And the contacts with the disclosing party are discrete and less 
varied. Consequently, it is relatively cost-effective to employ control of 
information flow as an alternative means of enforcing compliance. 
 
 236. Cf. Burstein, supra note 21, at 256–58 (identifying the control of information flow as one 
strategy used by those who must contract over information in the absence of property rules protecting 
that information). 
 237. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 13, at 890. 
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Some readers will notice that my description of the differences between 
the case of the Chief Marketing Officer and that of the supplier mirrors in 
important ways how Ian Macneil and Stewart Macaulay talked about relational 
contracting.238 They conceived of contracts as falling on a spectrum from arm’s 
length to relational, with the precise location on the spectrum a function of the 
“duration of the relationship; thickness of future ties between the contracting 
parties; and the clarity of future rights and obligations.”239 In other words, one 
could say that the more relational a contractual relationship, the more costly it 
will be to regulate insider trading in the relationship by controlling information 
flow. The reasons for this are because of the very nature of those relational 
contracts, as described by Macneil and Macaulay. 
Another way of thinking about this is through the lens of the institutional 
economics literature that emerged out of Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm.240 
Indeed, some characterize Coase’s theory as a theory of relational contracting,241 
and Coase himself seemed to validate this view.242 Coase’s insight was that, as 
transaction costs increase, economic production will go from being organized 
through arm’s-length contracting to being organized in firms or hierarchies.243 
More modern elaborations of Coase’s insight find that there exists a spectrum 
of economic organization with firms on one end, contracts on the other and 
 
 238. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 62–63 (1963); Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts 
About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 778 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, 
The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 718–19 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Relational 
Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, 
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 509. See generally IAN R. 
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (providing a general understanding of Ian Macneil’s thoughts on relational 
contracting). 
 239. D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). 
 240. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–92 (1937) [hereinafter 
Coase, Nature of the Firm]; see also George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2009). For a general introduction to Coase’s work, see generally NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK (Éric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2008).  
 241. See Smith & King, supra note 239, at 16. 
 242. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: 
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 48, 56 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 
1991) [hereinafter Coase, Meaning] (“A number of economists have said in recent years that the problem 
of the firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements. I have never thought otherwise.”). 
 243. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 240, at 390–95. 
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more hybrid organizations, like joint ventures, strategic alliances,244 and other 
interfirm collaborations, in the muddy middle.245 
Thus, through the Coase lens, what Macauley and Macneil identified were 
the determinants of the variation in transaction costs among different types of 
contracting relationships, where relatively longer-term, more thickly tied, open-
ended relationships are associated with greater transaction costs. And these 
high-transaction-cost relationships are more likely to be organized within a 
firm.246 But high-transaction-cost relationships are not limited to firms. Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued that these same factors that 
underlie relatively greater transaction costs and that lead to hierarchies and 
relational contracts also seem to determine the existence of fiduciary duties.247 
We can see this represented in figure 1. 
  
 
 244. See George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 BUS. LAW. 
55, 55, 57 (2001); Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination 
Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 781, 781 (1998) (“An alliance 
is commonly defined as any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between firms that involves 
exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners of capital, 
technology, or firm-specific assets.”); Claude Ménard, The Economics of Hybrid Organizations, 160 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 345, 352–55 (2004) (“Last, there are alliances among firms, 
particularly frequent when the development or transfer of technologies is at stake. Here, we are closer 
to standard contractual practices.”). For background on hybrid arrangements more generally, see Geis, 
supra note 240, at 121–26; Joanne E. Oxley & Brian S. Silverman, Inter-Firm Alliances: A New 
Institutional Economics Approach, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK, supra note 
240. 
 245. See Oxley & Silverman, supra note 244, at 209. 
 246. See Smith & King, supra note 239, at 16–18; see also Geis, supra note 240, at 122. 
 247. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 196, at 427 (“[W]e concluded, a 
‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and 
monitoring. The duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of 
loyalty by prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap 
and all promises fully enforced. The usual economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies 
then apply. Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort 
of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”). 
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Figure 1: Alternative Means of Regulating Insider Trading  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that, as a means of regulating insider trading, 
controlling information flow depends on the costs of doing so, which depends 
on the nature of the relationship. It seems that those costs are likely to be 
directly related to the factors that determine the existence of firms and 
hierarchies. In other words, information sources will find it relatively more 
costly to regulate insider trading based on that information by controlling 
information flow when in the context of firms or fiduciary relationships than in 
the context of arm’s-length contracts. 
To summarize, the question is under what circumstances we might expect 
sources and recipients of information to contract for fraud liability under Rule 
10b-5 to regulate the risk of insider trading. This analysis suggests that, 
everything else equal, sources and their recipients will find it cost effective to 
opt into the Rule 10b-5 liability regime (through the use of a reporting 
covenant) where there is no alternative disclosure regime that would reduce the 
costs of detection, and where there is no alternative means of deterring insider 
trading by, for example, controlling information flow. 
b. Answering the Question Posed by the Private-Welfare Maximization 
View 
The foregoing analysis allows us to finally suggest an answer to the 
question posed by the private-welfare maximization approach to the contractual 
fraud theory. That question is this: How does a court go about finding the 
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existence of an implied covenant to report the violation of an underlying duty 
not to engage in insider trading?248 
Under the private-welfare maximizing view, the court should ask what the 
parties themselves would have done had they addressed the issue. The answer, 
based on the foregoing analysis, is that in the absence of an alternative disclosure 
regime making it easier to detect the breach, courts should find an implied duty 
to report the breach in fiduciary and intrafirm relationships—and possibly in 
hybrid relationships—but not in arm’s-length contracting relationships. 
Consider an employee of IBM who uses material nonpublic information 
he obtains from his employer to trade in the stock of companies other than IBM. 
That’s the intrafirm case. Now, compare that to the arm’s-length case—instead 
of an employee of IBM, maybe a supplier in an arm’s-length contract with IBM 
(selling stuff in exchange for cash) who acquires the information from IBM 
during the course of that contractual relationship. As depicted in figure 1, the 
contractual fraud theory predicts that it is private-welfare maximizing for 
parties to regulate insider trading in the intrafirm case through fraud liability 
(under Rule 10b-5 by way of a reporting covenant) but to leave the parties to 
adopt alternatives to fraud liability in the arm’s-length case where the costs of 
doing so are relatively less. 
c. Testing the Answer to the Private-Welfare Maximizing View 
The further implication is that courts should adopt default rules reflecting 
this result—that is to say, a default reporting covenant in intrafirm relationships 
but not in arm’s-length ones. In fact, this is essentially what the Supreme Court 
did in O’Hagan.249 And, as discussed in greater detail below, although private 
parties could contract around the rule the Court announced in O’Hagan, they 
rarely do. This is evidence that this is in fact the private-welfare maximizing 
result. 
 
 248. Recall that under the contractual fraud theory, Rule 10b-5 is fundamentally about providing 
parties with the means to contract for fraud liability so as to reduce the detection costs inherent in 
insider trading. Contracting parties do so by including a covenant to report a breach of an underlying 
covenant not to engage in insider trading. These reporting covenants can be explicit or implicit. See 
supra notes 211–33 and accompanying text. 
 249. Regardless of how one reads O’Hagan, the opinion clearly holds that the misappropriation 
theory applies to situations involving fiduciary relationships like that which exists between a lawyer 
and his client. The opinion has also been assumed to apply to employer-employee relationships. See, 
e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 
2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (listing circumstances where the O’Hagan rule has applied as including 
attorney-client, employer-employee, and psychiatrist-patient). In other words, it would apply not just 
to the relationship between James O’Hagan and Grand Met but also to the relationship between Grand 
Met CEO and Grand Met. See, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the O’Hagan rule applies to a director who acquired from his own firm information concerning another 
corporation’s stock, which he traded in). 
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In O’Hagan, the Court held that non-disclosure of the trade is fraudulent 
in fiduciary relationships250 and, more generally, any employment 
relationship.251 This is what I have referred to as the “intrafirm” context. As I 
said previously, there is absolutely no theory at common law as to why the 
failure to report the underlying breach here would be fraudulent.252 
Under the contractual fraud theory, what the Supreme Court is doing is 
finding an implied reporting covenant in the relationship. This covenant 
provides that the recipient of the information has a duty to report the breach of 
the underlying negative insider trading covenant (in the fiduciary context, this 
negative insider trading covenant is simply contained within the duty of 
loyalty). Although under the common law the failure to report pursuant to such 
a reporting covenant would not be considered fraud, Rule 10b-5 alters that 
common law rule when considered under the contractual fraud theory. The 
Court in O’Hagan should be understood as finding an implied reporting 
covenant because it is a fiduciary relationship and, in the absence of an 
alternative disclosure regime, it is relatively cost effective to regulate insider 
trading in the context of fiduciary relationships through the threat of liability. 
Furthermore, the O’Hagan Court makes clear that this is a default rule, meaning 
that parties could contract for an alternative if this was not, in fact, the private-
welfare maximizing result. However, it is very unusual to see parties contract 
around the O’Hagan rule, so much so that the few exceptions are major business 
news items when they occur.253 Thus, it would appear that the Court’s approach 
to the intrafirm and fiduciary cases is precisely that which is predicted by the 
contractual fraud theory. 
But what about the other side of the spectrum, the case of contracting 
parties in an arm’s-length relationship—the example of the supplier to IBM in 
the example above? The contractual fraud theory predicts that it is not private-
welfare maximizing for these arm’s-length contracting parties to include 
reporting covenants in their agreements because there are more cost-effective 
alternatives in this context for regulating insider trading, including by 
controlling information flow. Thus, under the contractual fraud theory, courts 
should not find implied reporting covenants in these arm’s-length contracts. 
 
 250. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647, 652–53 (1997) (affirming that trading based 
on nonpublic information constitutes fraud partly because it is a transaction based in deception). 
 251. See Falcone, 257 F.3d at 228 (holding that misappropriation in the employment context 
violates § 10(b) even when the misappropriation itself lacks “a certain nexus with securities trading”). 
 252. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Kathleen Day, Cold Researcher Made Profit on Quigley Shares, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1997, 
at G1 (recounting how an employer authorized a scientist involved in a clinical trial of a medical product 
to purchase the stock of the product’s manufacturer before the public announcement of the trial’s 
positive results). 
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The O’Hagan Court never clearly stated that its implied reporting 
covenant does not apply to arm’s-length relationships.254 To be sure, the SEC 
has taken the position in Rule 10b5-2 that the O’Hagan rule applies in any 
contractual situation where the parties have included a confidentiality 
agreement.255 Yet, courts have not always been deferential to the SEC’s view.256 
Some courts have taken the position that an explicit non-use agreement is a 
necessary condition for finding insider trading liability.257 Other courts have 
suggested that still more is required, demanding nothing less than the 
“functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”258 Thus, at the very least, 
there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the factual predicates for 
triggering insider trading liability under O’Hagan. 
What is quite clear, however, is that private parties wishing to ensure that 
the O’Hagan rule applies to their relationship—thus avoiding this uncertainty—
could do so by explicitly adopting in their contract the federal opt-in provisions 
outlined above.259 Yet, parties to arm’s-length contracts do not take this route. 
Nor are there any readily identifiable examples of an arm’s-length contract 
where private parties have decided to opt into the federal insider trading regime 
by including contractual provisions resembling the federal opt-in provisions 
discussed previously. This observation suggests that, in these arm’s-length 
contracting cases, it does not maximize the parties’ welfare to contract for fraud 
liability by opting into the Rule 10b-5 regime. This is precisely what the 
contractual fraud theory of insider trading predicts. 
 
 254. Indeed, it was because of this lack of clarity that the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2. See 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,729 (Aug. 24, 2000) (explaining, 
post-O’Hagan, that Rule 10b5-2 is necessary in order to clarify the types of relationships that give rise 
to insider trading liability). 
 255. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2019). 
 256. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that, for insider 
trading liability to attach, the trader must be subject to an agreement that “impose[s] on the party who 
receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the information 
for personal gain”), vacated on other grounds, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 258. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). To be clear, most 
courts seem to interpret Chestman as holding that a confidentiality agreement alone is sufficient to give 
rise to insider trading liability based on information that is the subject of that agreement. Indeed, the 
Chestman opinion does suggest as much. See id. at 571 (“Keith’s status as Susan’s husband could not 
itself establish fiduciary status. Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express agreement of 
confidentiality, could the coda—‘Don’t tell.’”). However, this aspect of the opinion, amounting to little 
more than dicta, seems at odds with the “functional equivalent” language. Perhaps for this reason, some 
commentators have taken Chestman at face value and assumed that it requires “something more than a 
mere contract.” Bainbridge, Post-Fiduciary Duty Era, supra note 43, at 87. 
 259. In other words, a non-use or confidentiality agreement combined with a reporting covenant. 
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
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2.  The Public-Welfare Maximizing View 
Up to this point, in determining how courts should decide whether to find 
an implied reporting covenant in a given information sharing relationship under 
the contractual fraud theory, the discussion has focused on maximizing private 
welfare—in other words, the joint welfare of the contract parties themselves. 
However, there is an alternative way of interpreting these contracts. 
Courts (or the SEC) could alternatively take a public-welfare maximizing view 
in determining whether a contract contains an implicit provision for fraud 
liability. They could decide whether to find an implied reporting covenant in 
these contracts (and therefore effectively decide whether Rule 10b-5 applies) 
based on considerations about the public costs and benefits of insider trading. If 
they thought that public welfare would be reduced if insider trading was allowed 
in a particular case, then they should find an implied reporting covenant. 
Otherwise, they should not. 
Many commentators have discussed the public costs and benefits of insider 
trading.260 As the purpose of this Article is not to expand upon that discussion, 
a summary will suffice. The social costs and benefits can be boiled down largely 
to what one might call market integrity costs and market efficiency benefits. 
The idea behind market integrity costs is that insider trading will create the 
perception, if not the reality, that the market is “rigged” and only serves to 
benefit the well-placed and the well-heeled of corporate America.261 A decrease 
 
 260. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock 
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 
1230–40 (1981) (arguing that, although a corporation could lose value if it acquired a reputation for 
insider trading, it is nearly impossible to identify those actually harmed by insider trading). For further 
elaboration on this view, see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 
§ 2.1, at 9–10 (3d ed. 2010); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the 
“Chicago School”, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 630 (arguing that “insider trading harms neither the individual 
investor nor the market’s allocational efficiency”); Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing 
Market: Who Should Regulate What?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 264 (1992) (calling for a 
reconsideration of the purpose behind regulating insider trading); Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, The 
Insider Trading Debate, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., 1997, at 34, 34 (noting that a 
“substantial body of academic and legal scholarship questions whether insider trading is even harmful, 
much less worthy of legal action”). 
 261. This idea is one of the interpretations that is given to the claim that insider trading is “unfair.” 
See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 13, at 448. The general unfairness claim has been criticized for its lack of 
clarity. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 324 (“I suspect that few people who invoke arguments 
based on fairness have in mind any particular content for the term.”); Saul Levmore, Securities and 
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 119–20 (1982) (arguing that 
proponents of a “fair” insider trading rule have failed to define the term and proposing a more definitive 
standard); Jonathan R. Macey, Ethics, Economics, and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the 
Firm, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 785, 787 (1988) [hereinafter Macey, Theory of the Firm] (“The current 
scholarship that decries insider trading as ‘unfair’ completely lacks reasoned argument. Often those 
who brand insider trading as unfair do not even attempt to explain what insider trading is, much less 
why it is unfair.”). 
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in market integrity is feared to lead to a decrease in market participation, which 
would result in lower liquidity.262 
Balanced against this cost that insider trading might undermine the 
integrity of markets is the possibility that it might result in markets that are 
more informationally and allocatively efficient.263 If insiders and others can 
trade on material nonpublic information, then at least some subset of that 
information will be compounded into prices more quickly than in the absence 
of insider trading.264 In other words, insider trading might lead to markets that 
are more informationally efficient.265 Furthermore, the individuals doing the 
insider trading will include insiders who are particularly expert at valuing the 
information in question, suggesting that prices will be more accurate in valuing 
underlying assets.266 In other words, insider trading might also lead to markets 
that are more fundamentally efficient. Market efficiency is important among 
other things because it is correlated with greater gross domestic product and 
societal wealth more generally.267 
However one thinks that these costs and benefits balance out, one might 
nevertheless chafe at the larger argument being made here—that judicial or 
regulatory decisionmakers might interpret contracts in light of public, not 
 
 262. The counterargument is that the concern over market integrity costs depends to a certain 
extent on the existence of a victim who is harmed by insider trading, and there is no consensus that 
insider trading results in such harm. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Incorporating State Fiduciary Duties, supra note 
13, at 1241–42 (arguing that, because there is no evidence that investors are actually harmed by insider 
trading, there is little cause to believe that insider trading would undermine investor confidence); 
Krawiec, supra note 13, at 443 (“[C]ommentators are unable to agree whether insider trading causes 
losses to other marketplace actors and, if so, to whom.”).  
 263. See generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 78–104 (1966) 
(arguing that “any rules designed to prohibit insider trading will, on the average, generate much steeper 
price increases than will the free-trading rule,” and providing graphical representations of the effects 
of various potential regulatory schemes). 
 264. See id. at 88–90. 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. 
 267. Critics, however, have pointed out that it is unlikely that insider trading will result in 
significant price movements without the insider’s private information being transmitted to the market. 
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
630–32 (1984) (arguing that market expectation regarding a particular security will only be affected if 
insider information is widely disseminated); see also Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities 
Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1095 (1985) (“It is possible that [an insider 
trader’s] contribution may have no market value.”). And this is almost certainly true as long as it is 
assumed that insiders are subject to significant wealth constraints, which seems reasonable. However, 
even in the absence of disclosure of the insider’s private information, insider trading could affect stock 
prices if the insider were required to disclose her identity and contemplated trades beforehand, as some 
commentators have suggested. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading 
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 315 (1998); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 267, 
at 632 (stating that any argument for allowing insider trading “must also consider a recommendation 
that the insider be required to disclose, at some period before trading, his identity and the size of the 
intended trade”). 
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private, considerations. This suggestion might seem eccentric—to put it 
mildly—but it is not unprecedented. After all, it is well established in contract 
law that courts can refuse to enforce contracts for public policy reasons.268 Such 
a judgment constitutes an act of interpretation with a view toward public 
welfare maximization. Additionally, certain contract doctrines are arguably used 
to benefit third parties.269 
However, one thing is for certain: given the nature of the public-welfare 
maximizing determination, it does not seem like an inquiry that is naturally 
suited for the judiciary. It seems more appropriately allocated to the province 
of expert regulators, such as the SEC. 
The Contractual Fraud Theory Compared to the Alternatives 
We have now considered the contractual fraud theory in some depth. But 
we haven’t yet considered how it stacks up to the alternative theories of insider 
trading. Recall that these alternative theories have all sorts of problems. They 
have a difficult time explaining the law, including both Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2. They treat the statute’s basis in fraud 
as an inconvenient truth. They are susceptible to the federalism criticism that 
they will result in securities law concerns driving changes in traditionally state 
law categories like property, fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. They do 
not explain the structure of the O’Hagan rule that the trader should be able to 
escape liability by either providing the information source with prior notice or 
by obtaining the source’s prior approval. And they do not provide a way of 
reconciling O’Hagan and Santa Fe. One of the virtues of the contractual fraud 
theory, in contrast, is that it addresses all of these concerns. 
1.  Explaining the Law 
The contractual fraud theory does a better job than the alternatives in 
explaining the lines that the Supreme Court has drawn in its insider trading 
jurisprudence. Those lines demand liability for insider trading in the context of 
some—but, in light of Santa Fe, not all—fiduciary relationships and disallow 
liability where there is neither a contractual nor fiduciary relationship, even in 
the case of theft.270 As discussed previously, none of the extant theories of 
insider trading do a very good job explaining this line-drawing.271 
 
 268. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:1, at 717 (Richard 
A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
 269. See Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 213–14 (2015) (citing the 
example of judicial preference for clear allocations of property rights in real estate transactions, a “rule 
which benefits future buyers as well as creditors”). 
 270. See supra Sections I.B.1–3. 
 271. See supra notes 165–90 and accompanying text. The fiduciary theory has a difficult time 
explaining the result in Santa Fe. See supra notes 165–67, 177–87 and accompanying text. The property 
theory cannot explain the lack of liability in cases where there is neither a contractual nor fiduciary 
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The contractual fraud theory, by contrast, can explain this line-drawing. 
With respect to Santa Fe, the contractual fraud theory allows the court to infer 
a contractual duty to disclose the underlying breach. However, this inference is 
justified only in certain circumstances, namely where an alternative disclosure 
regime might reduce the costs of detecting the underlying breach and where it 
is feasible to regulate insider trading by controlling information flow. Thus, a 
fiduciary relationship is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
liability under the contractual fraud theory, thereby creating space for the result 
in Santa Fe. 
Additionally, the contractual fraud theory does not run into the same 
problems as the property and unjust enrichment theories, particularly with 
regard to their demand for liability in cases (like theft) where the courts have 
not seemed willing to go.272 The contractual fraud theory requires at the very 
least that there be a contractual relationship between the trader and the source 
of the information. Accordingly, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it 
would not give rise to liability in a situation where there is no relationship 
between the trader and the information, regardless of how the information is 
acquired. 
2.  The Purpose of 10b-5 
The contractual fraud theory does not treat the statute’s basis in fraud as 
an inconvenient truth. Rather, it views fraud as central to the problem at issue, 
which is how to address, through contract, the fact that insider trading presents 
high detection costs. For this reason, the contractual fraud theory explains the 
existence of Rule 10b-5. We need Rule 10b-5 because without it the common 
law does not solve the costly detection problem.273 
3.  Federalism Concerns 
Recall that all of the alternative theories of insider trading raise thorny 
federalism issues.274 Specifically, each theory runs the risk of causing federal 
securities law concerns to drive the development of the common law categories 
of fiduciary duty, property, and unjust enrichment, traditionally areas of the 
law governed by the states. However, these concerns are substantially less 
acute—and perhaps avoided altogether—under the contractual fraud theory. 
 
relationship. See supra notes 168–73, 177–87 and accompanying text. And while the unjust enrichment 
theory might be able to account for the lack of liability in the case of the unaffiliated innocent acquirer, 
it cannot explain why there should be no liability in the case of the unaffiliated thief. See supra notes 
139–45, 174–90 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra Sections I.C.2–3.  
 273. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text. 
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The potential effect that the contractual fraud theory would have on the 
common law of contracts is more muted than the effect that other insider 
trading theories would have on these various common law categories. At worst, 
the contractual fraud theory would cause state courts to recognize explicitly 
made, contractually created fraud-based liability. In other words, under the 
common law, courts generally would not view the breach of a contractual 
covenant to disclose a secondary breach as giving rise to fraud liability (i.e., 
extracompensatory damages). The contractual fraud theory would view Rule 
10b-5 as altering this common law rule, at least as to those circumstances where 
the primary breach is the result of insider trading. 
One might object that the contractual fraud theory still creates a 
federalism concern. In particular, one might be concerned that common law 
courts would expand this result—allowing parties to contract for fraud liability 
in the insider trading context—so that it applies not solely where the breach is 
a covenant not to engage in insider trading under Rule 10b-5 but where there is 
non-disclosure of the breach of any contractual duty, such as the failure to use 
a certain type of building material.275 For example, in cases like Richmond 
Metropolitan Authority v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc.,276 courts are reluctant to find 
fraud liability, even when there is an explicit misrepresentation, if the 
misrepresentation was the result of a breach of contractual duties.277 The 
federalism concern, then, might be that the contractual fraud theory would 
cause courts to expand fraud liability to cases like Richmond Metropolitan. 
But this strikes me as a much less significant federalism concern than the 
one expressed with respect to the alternative theories of insider trading.278 The 
reason is that there are, in fact, contract-based reasons for this move for which 
prominent contract scholars have advocated.279 By contrast, with respect to the 
federalism concern over the fiduciary-based theory of insider trading, for 
example, it does seem that what would be driving the expansion of fiduciary 
duty law would be securities law, which would not really have anything to do 
with the concerns that animate fiduciary duty law. 
4.  Making Sense of O’Hagan 
The alternative theories all have a difficult time explaining O’Hagan. 
Conversely, the contractual fraud theory helps address three problems with the 
 
 275. See, e.g., Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 344, 347 (Va. 1998) 
(finding no fraud liability even though there were actual misrepresentations concerning the concealed 
building material in the certificate the construction company was required to deliver at the closing). 
 276. 507 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 1998). 
 277. Id. at 347.  
 278. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 279. See Klass, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that “parties now contract for liability in fraud”); see also 
Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 37 (identifying circumstances justifying noncompensatory 
damages). 
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case. The first is that, although the fraud the majority identifies is theoretically 
credible, it is one that is utterly unknown at common law.280 Recall that in 
O’Hagan, the Court identified the fraud as James O’Hagan’s failure to report 
the breach of an underlying duty of trust and confidentiality.281 The problem is 
that no common law court has ever held that the failure to report the breach of 
the duty of loyalty constitutes fraud. Nor has a court ever held that, in the 
absence of an explicit covenant to report a breach, the failure to report the 
breach of a contract is fraudulent. In fact, as discussed previously, courts appear 
reluctant to find fraud for a failure to disclose even when the contracting parties 
are subject to an explicit contractual duty to do so.282 So, what then is going on? 
The contractual fraud theory of insider trading provides an answer. Under this 
theory, Rule 10b-5 is to be understood as changing the common law approach 
here. 
The second O’Hagan problem that the contractual fraud theory addresses 
is the so-called brazen fiduciary problem,283 which has received almost universal 
criticism, even from O’Hagan’s supporters who view it, at best, as a bug in the 
Court’s approach.284 Under the contractual fraud theory, the brazen fiduciary 
problem is not a bug but a feature. After all, if the point of Rule 10b-5 is to allow 
for contracting parties to address the costly detection problem of insider 
trading, then Rule 10b-5 is unnecessary when detection is not difficult, such as 
where the brazen fiduciary provides notice of the intention to breach the 
underlying non-use provision. That is precisely the purpose of a reporting 
covenant: to either deter the contracting party from the violation of the 
underlying negative insider trading covenant or to cause him to disclose the 
violation when it occurs or is about to occur. 
Third, the contractual fraud theory helps make sense of the “in connection 
with” requirement in O’Hagan.285 The nature of information, and how it differs 
from money and other goods, is crucial. Information is non-rivalrous by nature. 
It is difficult to know if the information has been used improperly because its 
use is not obvious. Money’s use is obvious. In other words, the fact that this is 
embezzlement of information, rather than of money, is crucial to why it presents 
 
 280. The breach of a contractual obligation does not generally give rise to fraud at common law 
unless the promisor intended to breach at the time of entering into the contract. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (designating contracts 
induced by intentionally fraudulent manifestations as voidable by the non-fraudulent party). While 
some breaches of the duty of loyalty might also constitute fraud, not every breach does.  
 281. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 282. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 124, 135–37, 182, 199–204 and accompanying text. 
 284. See, e.g., Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: 
A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
865, 893–94 (2003) (the Assistant General Counsel of the SEC defending the O’Hagan opinion but 
acknowledging that the brazen fiduciary problem is a “gap” in the misappropriation theory). 
 285. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
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a costly detection problem. So, if the purpose of insider trading law under Rule 
10b-5 is to lower the costs of detection, then one would need to distinguish 
between the embezzlement of money and information. 
5.  Reconciling Santa Fe and O’Hagan 
The contractual fraud theory also helps achieve an outcome that other 
theories simply cannot: reconciling Santa Fe and O’Hagan.286 Not only that, but 
the theory accomplishes this goal on the terms that the O’Hagan majority itself 
suggested. Recall that the challenge lies in explaining why there was fraud in 
O’Hagan but not in Santa Fe, even though neither seems to involve a traditional 
case of fraud, whether by means of an affirmative misstatement or fraudulent 
concealment.287 The O’Hagan majority suggests that the fraud derives from 
James O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his fiduciary breach to his principal.288 
However, it is not clear why this constitutes fraud.289 Nor is it clear why this 
same rationale does not apply in Santa Fe, where the fiduciaries also failed to 
disclose their breach to their principals, the minority shareholders.290 
The contractual fraud theory addresses both of these concerns. First, it 
locates the source of the O’Hagan majority’s theory of fraud not in the common 
law of deceit (where one will search for it in vain) but in the common law of 
contract. It provides that Rule 10b-5 changes the common law rule barring 
contracting for fraud liability, at least in the case of insider trading, and implies 
that courts can find that such contracting is implied in certain cases, like 
O’Hagan. 
Second, the contractual fraud theory also addresses the other question 
raised by the O’Hagan majority’s rationale—why under that rationale there is 
no liability in Santa Fe. In other words, why is there no liability for the 
“halfhearted fiduciary,” the fiduciary who, unlike his brazen counterpart, 
discloses only circumstantial evidence of his breach?291 Under the contractual 
fraud theory, courts should generally find an implied duty to report the breach 
of an underlying covenant not to engage in insider trading in intrafirm and 
fiduciary relationships (and possibly hybrid organization) but not in arm’s-
length relationships. This is true unless an alternative disclosure regime makes 
it less costly to detect the breach of the prohibition on insider trading. It turns 
out that Santa Fe is just such a case where an alternative disclosure regime makes 
it less costly to detect the breach. There, the fiduciaries didn’t actually disclose 
their breach, but they did disclose other facts—related to the valuation of the 
 
 286. See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.  
 287. See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
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corporate assets—that made it less costly for the plaintiffs to detect the breach. 
Under the contractual fraud theory, where detection costs are low, there is no 
need for fraud damages to incentivize the corporate executives to cooperate in 
recovery by reporting the breach. This is not the case, however, in O’Hagan 
where the detection costs are truly high and there is no relevant disclosure 
regime disclosing relevant facts surrounding James O’Hagan’s fiduciary 
violation. Under the contractual fraud theory, that key difference explains why 
the Court reached such different outcomes. 
Fixing Chiarella 
The most significant challenge to the contractual fraud theory is how to 
reconcile it with the classical theory of insider trading, as articulated in 
Chiarella. Recall that in Chiarella, the Court premised insider trading liability 
on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, holding that Rule 10b-5 liability 
applies when an insider, trading with his own shareholders, fails to disclose 
material nonpublic information.292 Under the traditional interpretation of 
Chiarella, there is a near consensus that the liability rule articulated in the case 
is not a default that can be contracted around, a view that is clearly at odds with 
the contractual fraud theory of insider trading.293 
The best response to this objection is that the traditional interpretation of 
Chiarella is simply wrong. The correct interpretation only comes from reading 
the case in light of the contractual fraud theory, which I believe underlies the 
doctrine announced in O’Hagan and Santa Fe. When read correctly, the 
traditional understanding of Chiarella changes. No longer does the case stand 
for the proposition that a CEO’s trading on the basis of his own company’s 
information is fraudulent because of his failure to disclose the inside 
information to the shareholder against whom he is trading and to whom he owes 
fiduciary duties. That is the traditional interpretation of Chiarella, the so-called 
“classical theory.”294 Rather, under the contractual fraud reading of Chiarella, 
the fraud arises instead from the CEO’s breach of an implicit contractual duty 
to disclose the violation of the underlying fiduciary obligation not to trade on 
the company’s inside information. The difference is subtle but significant 
because this reading effectively unifies the two cases—Chiarella and O’Hagan—
under the same doctrinal framework. The consequence is that even under 
Chiarella, parties can, as in O’Hagan, contract around insider trading liability 
and the insider himself can avoid liability by disclosing the underlying fiduciary 
violation to the board of his company. 
 
 292. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
 293. See Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation, supra note 12, at 1647–48. 
 294. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
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Critics will no doubt call this approach a revisionist reading, and it 
certainly is that, but it is also a reading that avoids a major legal error committed 
by the Chiarella Court while at the same time correcting for the pathologies of 
the traditional reading of the opinion. The major legal error in Chiarella was the 
Court’s assumption that insider trading, particularly when conducted over 
impersonal markets rather than in face-to-face transactions, constituted 
common law fraud.295 In fact, that assumption was false, and well-known, well-
established cases like Goodwin v. Agassiz296 support this point.297 
What was indisputable at common law was that insider trading, although 
not fraudulent, nevertheless violated an insider’s fiduciary duties.298 And the 
contractual fraud theory is about whether one can find a contractual obligation, 
either explicit or implicit, to disclose that underlying fiduciary violation. 
Reading Chiarella in light of the contractual fraud theory avoids the need to 
contradict cases like Goodwin or to argue that Rule 10b-5 somehow reversed the 
law of Goodwin. To be sure, it does not allow one to avoid having to argue that 
Rule 10b-5 altered the common law rule against contracting for fraud damages. 
Indeed, that proposition is central to the contractual fraud theory as I have laid 
it out here.299 However, there seem to be few if any cases explicitly holding that 
private parties cannot contract for fraud damages with respect to insider trading 
whereas there are many cases holding, like Goodwin, that insider trading over 
impersonal markets is not fraudulent.300 For this reason, it seems less of a stretch 
to argue that Rule 10b-5 implicitly altered the common law prohibition against 
contracting for fraud damages (at least in connection with insider trading) than 
that it implicitly overturned cases like Goodwin. 
Not only does this contractual fraud reading of Chiarella resolve the 
opinion’s major legal error, but it also avoids some of the pathologies that have 
resulted from the traditional interpretation of the opinion. For example, under 
that traditional interpretation, there should be no liability for insider trading in 
debt instruments.301 Nor does the traditional interpretation lead to intuitive 
results with respect to open market repurchases. The traditional interpretation 
implies that, when conducted during a period where insiders are in possession 
of material nonpublic information, repurchases should either never result in 
 
 295. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 296. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933). 
 297. See id. at 661—62 (holding that there is no duty to disclose and therefore no common law 
fraud where the insider in possession of material nonpublic information trades over an impersonal 
exchange); Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 1225, 1241–42 & 
nn.104–08 (2017).  
 298. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 188–90, 273 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Gubler, supra note 297, at 1241–42 & nn.104–06. 
 301. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text; see also Pritchard, Agency Law and Powell’s 
Legacy, supra note 77, at 28 (noting that the classical theory does not prevent insider trading in bonds). 
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liability or always result in liability.302 Yet, in reality, it seems that the issue is 
probably significantly more complicated than that.303 By bringing Chiarella and 
O’Hagan under the same doctrinal framework, the contractual fraud theory 
effectively creates a unified theory of insider trading law. As I have explained 
elsewhere,304 such a doctrinal move would have the effect of fixing these 
pathologies caused by the traditional reading of Chiarella. 
In other words, the contractual fraud theory is not so much at odds with 
Chiarella as it is with the traditional interpretation of that case, an interpretation 
founded upon an erroneous assumption about the common law and one that 
leads to unnecessarily pathological effects. Reading the case in light of the 
contractual fraud theory, that theory avoids both the erroneous assumption and 
these untoward, unintended consequences. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRACTUAL FRAUD THEORY 
In addition to its explanatory power with respect to insider trading 
jurisprudence, the contractual fraud theory also has a number of other important 
implications. 
The Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under Rule 10b-5 
One of the most important, unanswered questions in insider trading law 
after O’Hagan is the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5. In United States v. 
Chestman,305 the Second Circuit held that the domain of insider trading law was 
defined by the fiduciary relationship or its functional equivalent.306 Thus, the 
Chestman court focused on the hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary 
relationship.307 It explained that a fiduciary relationship or its “functional 
equivalent” “cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with 
confidential information.”308 Instead, the Chestman Court required “reliance, 
and de facto control and dominance” on the one hand and “discretionary 
authority and dependency” on the other.309 A California district court, 
synthesizing the Chestman rule, has held that the rule requires “(1) disparate 
 
 302. See Gubler, supra note 297, at 1248–51; see also Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the 
Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 813–14 (2014) (explaining that although the SEC takes the position 
that corporate repurchases may give rise to insider trading liability, the doctrinal grounds for this 
position are “shaky”). 
 303. See Gubler, supra note 297, at 1251–52. 
 304. See Gubler, supra note 297, at 1255–59. 
 305. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 306. Id. at 567–70. 
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. at 567. 
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98 N.C. L. REV. 533 (2020) 
588 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
knowledge and expertise, (2) a persuasive need to share confidential 
information, and (3) a legal duty to render competent aid.”310 
In order to understand the Chestman court’s approach, keep in mind that 
the case was decided before O’Hagan but after Chiarella, and it was Chiarella 
that seemed to adopt a fiduciary-based theory of insider trading law.311 Thus, it 
should not be too surprising that the Second Circuit seemed to be grounding 
insider trading liability in fiduciary duty law. The problem, of course, is that 
the policies underlying that theory—minimizing the costs associated with 
fiduciary breaches—are in significant tension with Santa Fe, where the court 
held that a fiduciary breach alone is insufficient for purposes of Rule 10b-5.312 
Additionally, the fiduciary-based theory is fundamentally at odds with the 
approach taken in O’Hagan, where one can escape liability through disclosure 
of the breach.313 Perhaps for these reasons, some circuits have refused to follow 
Chestman,314 instead requiring little more than a promise or expectation of 
confidentiality.315 
Thus, there is disagreement as to the scope of insider trading liability 
under Rule 10b-5, with some circuits taking the narrower Chestman approach 
(requiring the “functional equivalent” of a fiduciary relationship) and other 
circuits taking a broader one (requiring nothing more than a confidentiality 
agreement).316 The contractual fraud theory, by contrast, takes the middle 
road—it implies that the Chestman approach is indeed too narrow and that 
purely contractual relationships can, and in some cases probably should, give 
rise to Rule 10b-5 liability. 
However, unlike those courts that refuse to follow Chestman, the question 
under the contractual fraud theory is not merely whether the relationship 
involves a promise or expectation of confidentiality. Rather, the question is 
whether a court or the SEC should find an implied reporting covenant in such 
a relationship. That determination turns on whether one thinks that the goal of 
that interpretive task is to maximize private or public welfare. If private, then 
 
 310. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 311. See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 314. See SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) (overruling district court decision 
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 316. See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text. 
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that determination turns on the availability of an alternative disclosure regime 
and the plausibility of regulating the confidentiality by controlling information 
flow.317 If instead the goal is public welfare maximization, then the 
determination turns on the public benefits and costs of insider trading law.318 
The Contractual Fraud Theory Implies That a Confidentiality or Non-Use 
Agreement Is Necessary for Rule 10b-5 Liability 
In this debate over whether a contractual relationship can form the basis 
for Rule 10b-5 liability, the contractual fraud theory sides with the broader 
view—that a contractual relationship can give rise to such liability. But there is 
a wide gulf between “can” and “does,” and in this case the distinction turns on 
the type of contract in question. Under Rule 10b5-2, a mere agreement to 
maintain the confidentiality of information is sufficient to give rise to Rule 10b-
5 liability, and several courts have endorsed this view.319 But in the Cuban case, 
the district court held that a confidentiality agreement was insufficient and that 
something more (like a non-use agreement) was required.320 The Fifth Circuit 
did not reverse this decision on appeal.321 The contractual fraud theory implies 
that the Cuban district court is wrong. 
Under the contractual fraud theory, Rule 10b-5 is necessary because it 
alters the common law rule against contracting for fraud liability, and it does so 
to help solve the costly detection problem of contracting. Of course, this 
alteration only raises the question as to why federal law should play this role. 
But the answer is that insider trading has potential public costs and benefits and 
therefore does not unreasonably fall within the purview of federal regulation.322 
This recognition of the public costs and benefits of insider trading implicit 
in the contractual fraud theory also explains why a confidentiality agreement 
should count as a negative insider trading covenant—in other words, a covenant 
that is breached through insider trading. If insider trading has public costs and 
benefits, this is because the market itself can observe the trading (and infer the 
positive or negative nature of the underlying information) without disclosure 
of the underlying information. Thus, insider trading should be viewed as a 
breach of confidentiality even if the content of the underlying information is 
not disclosed. 
 
 317. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 318. See supra Section II.A.2. 
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Of course, this does not mean that under the contractual fraud theory a 
confidentiality agreement automatically gives rise to insider trading liability. In 
fact, as explained above, this is not true.323 Courts or the SEC must still decide 
whether that relationship contains a reporting covenant (express or implied).324 
The Contractual Fraud Theory Implies that Rule 10b5-2 Is Valid 
The contractual fraud theory allows for the SEC to take a different view 
of the scope of Rule 10b-5 than the courts. The theory requires the 
interpretation of both the contract and whether a given contractual relationship 
contains a reporting covenant (either express or implied). The determination of 
whether there is an implied reporting covenant depends on whether one takes 
a private- or public-welfare maximizing approach to the interpretive task. I’ve 
suggested that institutional competence concerns weigh in favor of the courts 
taking a private-welfare maximizing approach.325 This implies that courts should 
find an implied reporting covenant (and therefore Rule 10b-5 liability for 
insider trading) in intrafirm and fiduciary relationships but not in arm’s-length 
contracts—leaving some flexibility for those relationships that fall between 
these two extremes. But the theory also implies that the SEC, with its relatively 
superior expertise in market-wide considerations, could take a public-welfare 
maximizing approach to the problem in which case it would focus on the public 
costs and benefits posed by insider trading. 
That brings us to the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2. That rule does not draw a 
distinction between different types of contractual relationships, let alone 
whether they are arm’s length or otherwise. Rather, it simply provides that a 
confidentiality agreement (whether express or implied) is sufficient for 
liability.326 That obviously departs significantly from what the contractual fraud 
theory implies since liability isn’t private-welfare maximizing for arm’s-length 
contracts. But the SEC’s different approach is acceptable under the theory.327 
To be sure, this does not mean that there are no constraints on what the SEC 
can do here. At a minimum, parties must have entered into a contractual 
relationship subject to a confidentiality agreement, which is what Rule 10b5-2 
requires. Thus, while the rule is valid, it is bordering the limit of the SEC’s 
authority under the contractual fraud theory. 
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The Contractual Fraud Theory Has Important Implications for the Outstanding 
Circuit Splits 
Finally, the contractual fraud theory helps resolve all of the outstanding 
circuit splits in which scenario insider trading liability would be found, as 
illustrated in the following table: 
 
Table 3. Approaches to Rule 10b-5’s Application to Insider Trading:  
The Courts, the Extant Theories, and the Contractual Fraud Theory328 
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 334. Compare United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that Rule 
10b-5 liability arises from a mere relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences), SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555–58 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that Rule 10b-5 liability would arise from the breach of a non-use provision), and SEC v. Yun, 
327 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), with United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (requiring 
the breach of a fiduciary relationship or its “functional equivalent” for insider trading liability under 
Rule 10b-5), and United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (adopting the 
Chestman standard). 
 335. Compare McGee, 763 F.3d at 321–22 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), and Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73 (adopting an identical standard as McGee), with SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability can be premised 
on a contractual duty but requires something more than a confidentiality provision). 
 336. Compare McGee, 763 F.3d at 321–22 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555–58 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability would arise from the breach 
of a non-use provision), and Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a 
mere relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), with Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (requiring the breach of a fiduciary relationship or its 
“functional equivalent” for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5), and Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 
(adopting the Chestman standard). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 533 (2020) 
2020] INSIDER TRADING AS FRAUD 593 
 




























No No Yes No No No 
 
How then does the contractual fraud theory fare? Very well. In fact, it 
generates outcomes that are consistent with those that we observe in the real 
world. Under the contractual fraud theory, there is liability for breaches of the 
duty of loyalty but not if such breaches are disclosed, whether in a brazen or 
halfhearted manner. Thus, no liability in the first two cases, which is both 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and valuable in helping us distinguish 
Santa Fe and O’Hagan. 
Importantly, not only would the contractual fraud theory countenance 
liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty, it could theoretically extend liability 
to breaches of arm’s-length contracts and hybrid arrangements. Notice that this 
is true regardless of whether the breach is of a non-use or confidentiality 
provision. This is because, under the contractual fraud theory, insider trading 
is thought to have social costs and benefits that both make it an appropriate 
subject of federal law and make it so that insider trading violates confidentiality 
provisions as well as non-use provisions.340 However, the courts should only 
find an implicit reporting covenant where it maximizes private welfare, which 
is only in fiduciary and possibly hybrid arrangements.341 Thus, the courts cannot 
accomplish this expansion of liability on their own. 
 
 337. Compare McGee, 763 F.3d at 321–22 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability arises from a mere 
relationship, whether contractual or not, demonstrating a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences), and Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272–73 (adopting an identical standard as McGee), with Dorozhko, 
606 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (finding that Rule 10b-5 liability can be premised on a contractual duty but 
requires something more than a confidentiality provision). 
 338. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660–61 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 233–35 (1980). 
 339. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646–49, 659–60 (1983). 
 340. See supra Section II.A.2. 
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By contrast, the SEC can, consistent with the theory, take a broader, 
public-welfare maximizing approach than the courts, which it has done in 
promulgating Rule 10b5-2. That rule, which is probably at the limit of the 
SEC’s authority under the theory, would extend liability to the contract-based 
cases (cases three through six). Note also that there is no reason under the 
contractual fraud theory that would prevent the SEC from plugging the holes 
in liability created by the brazen fiduciary and the halfhearted fiduciary, which 
is why the relevant boxes in the table’s last column include a “yes.” However, 
this observation is merely aspirational, as the SEC has not yet taken such action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is often said that federal insider trading law is a mess, resists explanation, 
and defies the fraud-based foundations of the statutory regime. But if these 
complaints are true, maybe it is only because we have been telling ourselves the 
wrong story—that insider trading law is an attempt to enforce property rights 
in information, to rout out corrupt fiduciaries, or to deter unjust enrichment. 
We’ve constructed these elaborate stories because we have been assuming that 
fraud cannot possibly explain the law as it is nor as it should be. 
While this assumption possesses some truth, there is a version of the fraud 
story that makes normative and descriptive sense of the current landscape, 
avoiding the pitfalls of our other stories. This Article focused on that argument: 
Rule 10b-5 allows parties to effectively protect their information from insider 
trading by requiring counterparties to notify the information source of a breach 
and to enforce such duties contractually with fraud damages. In other words, 
Rule 10b-5 allows parties to contract for fraud liability. This contractual fraud 
theory explains much of what has been taken as messiness in the law. 
Some will, no doubt, balk at the idea that insider trading is ultimately 
about contract law with a bit of fraud thrown in for good measure. While it is 
true that this theory implies a fairly narrow liability regime if created by courts, 
it actually augurs in favor of a potentially broad insider trading regime, if 
created by the SEC. This is because, under the theory, the SEC—but not the 
courts—has the authority to interpret these contracts with the public welfare in 
mind, potentially extending liability to any confidentiality agreement, as the 
SEC has done in Rule 10b5-2. 
As with many things, in order to understand insider trading law’s future, 
it is first necessary to understand its present. The contractual fraud theory helps 
us see the present narrative in a clearer light, resolving the various circuit splits 
to bring the law in line with the theory in the short run. But the theory also 
helps us accomplish a longer-term goal: understanding the outer limits of the 
Rule 10b-5 regime, which is a necessary condition for thinking about whether 
this regime is adequately prepared to deal with the future of insider trading law. 
